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Chapter 1: Introduction
In a characteristically audacious opinion, the Supreme Court in 1965 declared
privacy a fundamental right in its opinion for Griswold v. Connecticut. Despite its
audacity, this assertion went largely unnoticed in most segments of society. But nearly a
decade later, Congress declared privacy a fundamental right in the highly-anticipated
Federal Privacy Act of 1974. Though the two statements were equally potent and legally
binding, each focused on disparate aspects of the right to privacy and sought to regulate
in independent realms. Why was this, and how did it happen? This project seeks to
explain what happened during those nine years to propel privacy from the deeper social
consciousness into mainstream discourse and gave it the vitality it needed to command a
response from the legislature. Whatever this momentum, it gave privacy the life it would
need to pervade society today, more than thirty years later.
I argue that it was exactly this—the independent development of privacy in
separate spheres, each with different intentions—that allowed privacy to take on a life of
its own. This research analyzes privacy’s legal development in Griswold and Roe v.
Wade in 1973, and then shifts to focus on privacy’s social and political path to
fundamentality during the same time period. I conclude that the steady increase in
privacy activity and awareness between 1965 and 1973 worked to put increasing pressure
on something of a privacy dam—a blockade that prevented complete understanding or
regulation of privacy. In 1973, two key events occurred in separate realms which caused
the dam to break entirely, resulting in the 1974 Privacy Act.
First, this project follows privacy’s path in the legal sphere by examining Court
opinions, case briefs, and trends in legal argument and analysis. After a discussion of
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Griswold and its aftermath, this thesis traces the ten cases before Roe in which the Court
mentions privacy. It then touches on the Court’s composition and the presidential politics
involved in judicial appointments pertinent to privacy, discusses trend change and
continuity between the Warren Court and the Burger Court, and concludes with an indepth discussion of Roe v. Wade. In short, it asserts that the Court struggled to define the
concept of privacy between 1965 and 1973. Its privacy cases centered largely around
criminals and deviants, and with the exception of Justice William O. Douglas, the justices
refused to apply their new concept of privacy in most of these cases. Still, it took the first
steps toward a systematic breakdown of privacy’s individual components by examining it
as specifically applied to criminal justice, tax evasion, and sexual deviance. Though it
denied privacy in the majority of these cases, it still began a trend of breaking down
privacy and comparing it to other fundamental rights. Douglas’ persistent defense of
privacy came to fruition in Roe v. Wade, with the Court’s declaration that privacy
irrefutably existed in the Constitution. The question was no longer whether a right to
privacy existed, but whether or not it included abortion.
Next, the thesis traces privacy’s political growth, by discussing White House
behaviors, legislative activity, media responses, and public opinion data. Through the use
of Congressional committee publications, proposed legislation, newspaper articles and
secondary sources, it presents privacy in both a legal and sociopolitical realm in an
attempt to explain privacy’s path. It begins with a discussion of privacy in Lyndon B.
Johnson’s presidency. It begins with a discussion of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s (FBI) spying practices, discusses the unusual liaison between the White
House and the FBI, and the resulting press coverage, and last follows the Congressional
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backlash to the illicit executive behavior, and the public’s reaction to the influx of
unusual governmental activity. The thesis then conducts a similar reconstruction of
media, legislative and public activity under Richard Nixon’s administration until news of
the Watergate scandal hit the front pages. These chapters argue that Congress, unlike the
Court, seemed unconcerned with criminal and reproductive privacy. Instead, in the early
1960s, it began to examine privacy from governmental intrusions. Beginning when J.
Edgar Hoover and the F.B.I began spying on domestic organizations like the Black
Panthers, the Ku Klux Klan, and politicians themselves, Congress became motivated to
investigate the FBI’s behavior. Along the way, it discovered myriad other agencies that
were blatantly invading citizens’ privacy. Even without a particular definition of privacy,
it was clear that the federal government had crossed a line. As Congress learned more
and more about federal intrusions, it publicized its findings. Politicians, the media and
the scholarly elite engaged in a discourse about privacy rights and how exactly they could
protect those rights. Despite the media and political attention, though, the general public
remained largely unmotivated to work for its own privacy rights. In other words, the
public was upset and fearful about the government investigating it , but did very little
about it. After 1965, this discourse slowly filtered down to the public until 1973 when
President Nixon’s Watergate scandal hit the public full-force and the Court handed down
Roe v. Wade.
Last, this thesis argues that the two-pronged attack on those who would reduce
privacy rights, from Roe v. Wade and the fallout from Watergate, produced a flood of
privacy related activity that left Congress with little choice but to pass the Privacy Act of
1974. It was in 1973 that the public was bombarded with the reality of the privacy
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situation: the federal government was compulsively gathering information on innocent
individuals and the Court was in a position to take away privacy rights not from criminals
or deviants, but from everyday women. Even though the Court had declared privacy to
be a fundamental right in 1965, it still had full authority to define the right. In 1973, it
threatened to constrict its broad right to an idea that could otherwise be found in the text
of the Constitution. At last, the public was motivated to act. The dam had broken and
the torrent of privacy-related activity followed. In late 1973 with the public fully
mobilized and the media relentlessly pursuing stories on governmental privacy invasions,
Congress began to take the necessary steps to dissect and protect privacy. Congress
formed a host of committees designed with the sole purpose of researching privacy
invasions, used privacy protection as its national platform, and proposed over 250 pieces
of legislation protecting the right. Within a year, Congress passed the Federal Privacy
Act, which declared privacy a fundamental right and laid out guidelines for protecting it.
It was a problematic makeshift solution to what had become a nationwide problem, but it
was a solution, nonetheless. With the combination of the Court’s application of privacy
to everyday women and Congress’ work to ensure future protection of privacy, the surge
of activity began to recede and America began to return to a more stable state.
Nevertheless, the idea of a fundamental right of privacy became engrained in the
American psyche and continued to increase throughout the gay-rights movement, the
September 11 terrorist attacks, and the war on terrorism, and even today shows no signs
of retreating.
In sum, I argue that the differing approaches, reflecting a social argument
conflicting with the concept, give privacy full-fledged salience in contemporary
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American society. Because privacy began as a commonly understood and
constitutionally supported right to personal property, and then took diverging paths
between the Court, which largely dealt with criminal, deviant, and reproductive privacy,
and the legislature, which dealt with privacy intrusions by the government, it filtered
through to society from two entirely different directions. The multiple-fold influence on
the public eye has given privacy particular potency today.
Still, this discussion begs the question of privacy’s importance as a source of
concern. Do we not have more pressing legal and political matters with which to occupy
our time and energy? In fact, we do not. A surprising number of issues past and present
fall under privacy’s reach, including those which do not seem like privacy issues at all.
In fact, privacy subsumes nearly every civil liberties issue we face. It encompasses
relationships, the body, the mind, the home, and the family. It determines how a family
can school its children, what a person can look at and where he can look at it, and
whether a criminal can be convicted with the evidence presented. Put differently, privacy
is a defense for many other fundamental liberties. It is both the starting ground and the
ending point for many different breeds of rights talk. For example, abortion, same-sex
marriage, sodomy all began with privacy claims and became more narrowly-tailored from
there. Wiretapping, religion, property and self-incrimination all end up at an individual’s
right to privacy. In other words, privacy exists in nearly social realm: the body, the mind,
the home, and the family. Also, privacy is unique because it can only be granted at the
expense of other liberties. If we feel entitled to it or want to discuss it, we must
understand that something else will have to give in order for privacy to prevail. This
creates a unique clash of fundamental rights, tied together by privacy.
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What made Griswold’s legal argument plausible is that so much of what we know
as concrete within the Bill of Rights does indeed share some philosophical touchstones
with a concept of privacy. It can be legally connected to four of the first ten
amendments, five of the first fourteen, and the “emanations from penumbras” of the
entire Bill of Rights. Throughout the 1960s and 70s, the Courts determined that the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourth Amendments all give foundation to various facets of
privacy. The First Amendment can protect our “ideas” privacy. With several important
exceptions, it gives us privacy to practice the religion we want, to say what we want, and
to believe what we want. The Fourth Amendment protects our physical privacy in our
homes and on our bodies. Our thoughts are also protected by the Fifth Amendment,
under which we do not have to disclose what we know. All other privacy-related rights
not specifically enumerated by the Bill of Rights emanate from the Ninth Amendment,
and courts and legislatures generally agree that the 1Fourth Amendment’s protection of
our liberties through due process of the laws protects our right to privacy. In these
amendments alone we can see that privacy exists implicit in the words of the
Constitution. Any other applications have grown as a result of privacy’s 250 year old
foundation. Today, those applications cross institutions, eliciting discussion from all
branches of government and numerous social realms, and still provide different
interpretations and areas of focus within those separate realms.
Of Property and Privacy: Historic Beginnings
We might not have anticipated this salience from the first known scientific
discussion of the right of privacy—Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’ historic 1890
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Harvard Law Review article asserting that privacy is the right “to be let alone.”1
Scholars and judges reacted to this article favorably, citing it amply in articles and
opinions in following years.2 Despite their analysis of this claim, privacy remained
ambiguous. Congress and the courts were unsure how to regulate or protect privacy, and
there is little indication that they wanted to protect it at all in the first half of the 20th
century. Perhaps this is because legislatures and courts did not view “privacy” issues as
we view them today. Instead, they were largely property based, as evidenced most
famously in Lochner v. New York (1905).3 Today, though scholars credit Lochner as a
case in which the Court refused to interfere with the privacy of an employer/employee
relationship,4 the actual opinion was more comprehensive. The Court declared that an
employer and an employee have a constitutionally protected right to make a contract,
even if the state deems it unfair. While the state can have an interest in regulating the
work conditions of its citizens, the employer’s right to purchase labor can be classified as
a fundamental right to property. From Lochner on, the government conflated “property”
and “privacy,” creating a broad concept of private property which it could easily regulate.
The Court and the legislature collaborated on property matters for two reasons.
First, the courts and legislatures shared a common goal of American economic
advancement, with the common assumption about the economic order that the economy
began with private property. But this is not the end of the story. But also, as one scholar

1

Warren, S. D., & Brandeis, L. D. (1890). The Right to Privacy. Harvard law review, 4(5), 193-220.
See e.g., A new phase of the right to privacy.(1896). Harvard law review, 10(3), 179-180; Marks v. Jaffa
26 N.Y. Sup. 908 (1894), Right to privacy again (1894). Harvard law review, 7(7), 425-426; and
Larremore, W. (1912). The law of privacy. Columbia law review, 12(8), 693-708.
3
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
4
See eg., Gavison, R. (1980). Privacy and the limits of law. The Yale law journal, 89(3), 421-471; Gillman,
H. (1993). The Constitution besieged. Durham: Duke University Press; and Cloud, M. (1996). The Fourth
Amendment during the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory. Stanford law
review, 48(3), 555-631.
2

9

notes, property should be understood as a “bundle of sticks.”5 Like privacy, it is a
collection of diverse interests, the most important of which is the right to exclude other
people from one’s personal property.6 When a person is on his private property, he has a
certain privacy interest which he is entitled to enforce through the legal system.
Therefore, we can see a clear interplay between the legislature, which creates the
property statutes and the courts, which judge them.
Even early cases we commonly reference as privacy cases, like Olmstead v. US
(1928),7 in which the Court held that evidence obtained by a wiretap on a public phone
was admissible as evidence in trial, are most strongly overlaid with the period’s
conception of property as the central force in rights. For decades, the Court had
approached it as a property issue, reasserting the 1886 decision of Boyd v. United States,
in which the Court acknowledged that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments protect an
individual’s property from governmental intrusion, acknowledging the importance of
privacy.8
Olmstead, Justice Brandeis attempted to distinguish privacy from property, stating
that the Founders “conferred as against the government the right to be let alone, the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man.” The other justices
ignored this dissent, ruling that the Bill of Rights, and the Fourth amendment in
particular, did not prevent the use of wiretaps on public phones because the public phone
was not Olmstead’s private property.

5

Finn, J. E. (2006). Privacy—the early cases. Civil liberties and the Bill of Rights lecture series. Chantilly,
Virginia: The Teaching Company.
6
Ibid.
7
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
8
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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Both property and privacy refer to larger notions about what it means to be an
individual, to follow the American dream, and to flourish as a human being not on one’s
own terms, but in a larger community of other individuals with other individual rights.
Governmental agencies saw property as the boundary between the individual and society.
However, legal trends between the 1920s and the 1960s veered away from this notion,9
under the influence of technology that enabled privacy intrusion outside the context of
property and the changing dynamic of how and whom the government chose to
investigate.10 By 1965, property no longer operated as the boundary between the
individual and society. It would be replaced, in part, by privacy.
Unlike property, which is clearly tethered in multiple sections of the Constitution,
privacy is an entirely different matter. “Those rights that we call ‘privacy rights’ are
entirely a function of judicial imagination.”11 To call them a judicial creation is to
assume that these rights do not exist in the Constitution. To say that the Court inferred
them is to assume that they are explicitly implicated in the Constitution. A middle
position is to see the legal foundation of privacy in shades of gray. Calling them a
product of judicial imagination implies that the Court was willing to be both flexible and
creative with its interpretation of the Constitution’s words. It was not until Griswold v.
Connecticut in 1965 that the Court claimed a Constitutional basis for the fundamental
right of privacy, though it was divided in its decision. Still, privacy existed as an
autonomous right, rather than as one subsumed by a more legally solidified right, like

9

Finn, J. E. (2006). Privacy—the early cases. Civil liberties and the Bill of Rights lecture series. Chantilly,
Virginia: The Teaching Company.
10
United States. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Special Subcommittee on
Invasion of Privacy. (1967). The computer and invasion of privacy. New York: Arno Press.
11
Finn, J. E. (2006). Privacy—the early cases. Civil liberties and the Bill of Rights lecture series.
Chantilly, Virginia: The Teaching Company.
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property or contracts. Because privacy drifted around constitutional doctrine and lacked
a substantive basis, it was still a function of the judicial imagination. In many ways, it
still is today.
Scholars do agree that since privacy took on a legal form in Griswold, the
American public has appropriated the term into regular conversation but cannot
necessarily define it. It is used in common language such that the American public has
disconnected it from its philosophical foundations. It garners the most public attention
when meddled with by the state, even with the increase in technology and information
accessibility.12 Even among experts it is debated. Harvard Law Professor Ruth Gavison
contends that when Americans use the word “privacy,” they usually mean, “being
completely inaccessible to others [the state included].” 13 This definition includes what
scholars like Gavison and Gerald Dworkin agree are central themes of privacy: secrecy,
anonymity, solitude and autonomy.14 Privacy expert Alan Westin also includes
intimacy.15 Westin suggests that when Americans say they want “complete privacy,”
they actually want “complete inaccessibility to others.” Such privacy would entail
complete withdrawal from society, often resulting in loneliness and lack of safety and
discipline. Therefore, “[t]he individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since
participation in society is an equally powerful desire.”16 Also, the individual does not
actually want total noninterference by the state. Rather, he wants state interference in the
form of legal protection against other individuals, and noninterference with personal

12

McClellan, G. S. (1976). The Right to privacy. New York: H. W. Wilson Co.
Gavison, R. (1980). Privacy and the Limits of Law. The Yale law journal, 89(3), 422.
14
See e.g., Gavison, R. (1980). Privacy and the Limits of Law. The Yale law journal, 89(3), 421-30; and
Dworkin, G. (1976). Autonomy and behavior control. The Hastings Center Report. 6(1), 23-28.
15
Westin, A. (1967). Privacy and Freedom. New York: Atheneum.
16
Ibid.
13
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decisions. 17 It then becomes the job of the legislature to provide an appropriate amount
of protection without infringing on personal decisions.
This potency has only increased since the Roe era. Studies collected by The
Roeper Center18 and Harris Polling19 between 1974 and 2006 demonstrate that
Americans’ concerns with threats to their personal privacy, both sexual and
informational, continually increased, while the numbers of Americans who are not
concerned at all about privacy rapidly dropped. Congressional hearings, too, indicate that
privacy is at the top of citizens’ list of political concerns.20 Furthermore, “[i]n the years
since 9/11, Americans have become less willing to sacrifice their civil liberties—even to
combat terrorism.”21 Immediately following the terrorist attacks, nearly half of
Americans were willing to sacrifice their privacy rights in order to combat terrorism, but
within nine months, two-thirds of Americans objected to privacy violations to combat
terrorism.22 That is, Americans’ views on privacy rights have returned to their preSeptember 11 state. This indicates unwavering public support for the right of personal
privacy that, in the decades surrounding its inception, had questionable origins in the
Constitution.
Among studies about the relationship between the Supreme Court and the public,
some scholars espouse a bottom-up approach as the most apt for discussing legal change.

17

Young, John B., ed. Privacy. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978.
Survey by Roper Organization. Retrieved November 19, 2006 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper
Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
<http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.
19
Survey by Harris Polling. Retrieved November 19, 2006 from the Harris Interactive Databank, Harris
Polling, Rochester: New York. <http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=671.>
20
United States. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on Government Management,
Information, and Technology. (2001). A complete examination of privacy protection. Washington: G.P.O.
21
Survey by The Gallup Organization, Retrieved November 19, 2006 from the Gallup Poll Online
Database. The Gallup Poll, Gallup University. < http://www.galluppoll.com>
22
Ibid.
18
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In this model, scholars examine the broader, more public instigators in change and trace
their effects through interest groups to Congress and courts. For example, Epstein and
Kobylka state the three main proponents in legal change: “the Court, the political
environment, and organized pressure groups lobbying the Court,” 23 where political
environment includes elected representatives and public opinion. They, along with
scholars like Charles Epp, argue that legal change initiates in activist groups and from
lawyers. It then works its way up to the legislature and eventually the Court.24 Other
scholars agree, stating that Court sponsored change comes from the people: “By all
arguable evidence the modern Supreme Court appears to reflect public opinion as
accurately as other policy makers.”25 In their discussion of privacy, these scholars
maintain that the revolution initiated in the grassroots.
I do not believe this to be the case. On the contrary, I advocate a top-down
approach to privacy’s rapidly changed legal and political status. This approach, opposite
to the bottom-up approach, credits the upper echelons and elites with becoming aware of
privacy invasions, generating more widespread interest in it, and sending it to the media,
which then filtered it down to the general public. In typical cases of legal or social
change, for example the Civil Rights movement, the people were the ones experiencing
the discrimination and advocating for change. The same is true for the women’s rights
movement. The privacy movement is unique in this sense because the general public was
unaware that their rights were being abused. As a result, the “bottom” was unable to
instigate the movement because it did not know there was a problem. Until Congress and
23

Epstein, L., & Kobylka, J. F. (1992). The Supreme Court and legal change : abortion and the death
penalty. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 9.
24
Epp, C. R. (1998). The rights revolution : lawyers, activists, and supreme courts in comparative
perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
25
Marshall, T. R. (1989). Public opinion and the Supreme Court. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
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the media caught wind of the privacy intrusions and disseminated information to other
areas of society, those intrusions remained private. This top-down approach is therefore
unique to situations in which the public is unaware of or unable to act on the problem at
hand.
As this research demonstrates, privacy-talk originated and remained in an elite
discourse for nearly a decade before the public took any action toward it. It took
continual pressure from the government and the Court and two monumental events to
elicit a chartable public response to privacy. In fact, with the exception of the American
Civil Liberties Union, there was little continuity amongst the lobby groups espousing
privacy rights, both informational and reproductive. This was true even after Roe, at
which point many pro-privacy interest groups turned their focus to abortion.26
Numerous scholars have studied privacy using a compartmentalized approach, or
examine a particular aspect of privacy in the government, Court, or society. For example,
the work of Alan Westin, a prolific privacy scholar, details the threats to public privacy
through changing technology in the government.27 David M. O’Brien and Priscilla
Regan trace different elements of privacy’s development in the legislature.28 Myriad
scholars discuss the philosophical state of privacy today, as it is understood or
misconstrued by lawmakers and the citizens.29 Still, current scholarship leaves
unanswered several important questions about the reasons for privacy’s salience today.

26

Epstein, L., & Kobylka, J. F. (1992). The Supreme Court and legal change : abortion and the death
penalty. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
27
Westin, A. (1967). Privacy and Freedom. New York: Atheneum.
28
See e.g., Regan, P. M. (1995). Legislating privacy : technology, social values, and public policy. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press.; and O'Brien, D. M. (1979). Privacy, law, and public policy. New
York: Praeger Special Studies.
29
See e.g., Posner, R. (1979). The uncertain protection of privacy by the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court Review; Gavison, R. (1980). Privacy and the Limits of Law. The Yale law journal, 89(3), 421-30;
and Dworkin, G. (1976). Autonomy and behavior control. The Hastings Center Report. 6(1), 23-28.
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While the ample privacy-related scholarship examines the disparate developments of
privacy in America, it neglects to study privacy as a multidimensional issue with
divergent and mutually reinforcing histories. The privacy that Americans envision today
did not originate from one place. Rather, it developed as a result of two key seemingly
unrelated influences. That said, we can now look at privacy’s independent and divergent
journey to fundamentality in the Court and the legislature to determine the reasons for its
vitality today.
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Chapter 2: “The Least Dangerous Branch” 30
To begin the discussion of the evolution and fortification of the “right to privacy”
in the American consciousness, we must first assess the different directions from which it
emerged. The legal discussion that was limited strictly to privacy began in 1965 when
the Supreme Court declared privacy to be a fundamental right.31 Once the Court initiated
the legal discourse about privacy, it would spend the next decade grappling with the
concept in relation to the Constitution, and more specifically, the Bill of Rights.
Meanwhile, privacy would gain a foothold in the other areas of society, but for entirely
different reasons. Because privacy emerged from many different corners of America
simultaneously, it was particularly fit to become a topic of great social, legal, and
political concern.
Griswold v. Connecticut
In 1961, the United States Supreme Court faced a potentially divisive decision.
The nine justices needed to issue a decision on Poe v. Ullman,32 a case questioning the
constitutionality of an 1879 Connecticut statute prohibiting married couples the use of
contraceptives and prohibiting doctors from advising about contraceptives. When the
plaintiffs were refused consultation about contraceptives because of the statute, they
30

Hamilton, A. (1788). The Federalist No. 78. Independent Journal.
The Court did, indeed, address the idea of privacy before Griswold. Warren and Brandeis’ Harvard Law
Review article originally discussed privacy as what scholars call “true” privacy. That is the privacy I
address in this study. However, the courts saw many cases relating to privacy as a tort, which delineated
into four categories. “True” privacy is only one of them. Other privacy torts fall under the classification of
“false light” privacy torts, intrusion torts, or appropriation torts. Under false light privacy, for example, a
person’s complaint is not about his personal information being investigated, but if the information
discovered portrays him incorrectly, or in a false light. The Court dealt with such privacy torts thoroughly
between 1890 and 1965, but did not grapple with the idea that privacy could be a fundamental right.
Rather, they handled privacy like a “haystack in a hurricane.” There was no attempt to declare it a
constitutionally protected right or define it. Courts only attempted to apply it on a case-by-case basis.
Because these dealings did little to crystallize privacy in the American mentality, I do not address them
here. See Prosser, W. L. (1960). Privacy. California law review. 48(3): 383-423.
32
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
31
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challenged it. Given that the law had never been enforced, however, the Supreme Court
dismissed the controversial Poe v. Ullman on the grounds that it was unripe. The Court
was able to dodge the issue in 1961, but understood the necessity of tackling it in a more
legally appropriate case. As soon as the Court issued its decision, Connecticut’s Planned
Parenthood branch began devising a case on which the Court would have to issue an
opinion.33
The test case involved Estelle Griswold and Dr. Lee Bruxton, two of the
architects of Poe, opening a Planned Parenthood clinic and publicly giving instruction,
information and advice about contraception to married individuals. They were promptly
arrested and taken to court for violating the Connecticut statute. The Court of Appeals to
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s guilty-finding in Griswold v. Connecticut and
the Connecticut Supreme Court also affirmed.34 Griswold and Planned Parenthood
applied to take their case to the United States Supreme Court.
In 1965, the Supreme Court claimed six justices who were recognized as some of
the most liberal in history: Earl Warren, Hugo Black, William Brennan, William
Douglas, Abe Fortas and Arthur Goldberg. The more conservative justices: John
Marshall Harlan, Potter Stewart and Byron White regularly favored constriction of civil
liberties,35 yet even so, are not regarded as so conservative as those in the 1930s or 1980s.
The justices undoubtedly had their ideological agendas for the formation of the Court’s
docket. Chief Justice Warren, who was known as particularly amiable and unifying,36
33

Bartee, A. F. (2006). Privacy rights : cases lost and causes won before the Supreme Court. Lanham, Md:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
34
Epstein, L., & Kobylka, J. F. (1992). The Supreme Court and legal change : abortion and the death
penalty. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
35
Ibid, 14.
36
Dixon, R. G. (1965). The right of privacy : a symposium on the implications of Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 497 (1965). New York: Da Capo Press, 1971, 60.

18

effectively marshaled these agendas into the Court’s docket. Leadership was necessary,
and chief justices historically have had such power to shape the Court’s direction.37
Their decisions and influences on other justices are intensified by large numbers of
amicus briefs, government involvement, typically found in successful Supreme Court
appeals.38 Griswold lacked in any of these areas. Aside from the conflicting opinions in
lower courts and its unresolved history, many courts would have seen no particular
urgency to this case. Chief Justice Warren, however, recognized it as a vital issue in civil
liberties adjudication. The other eight justices agreed. With very little discussion, all
nine justices voted to grant Griswold certiorari.39 The Court saw it as Poe, round two,
and an opportunity to issue a contraception holding once and for all. As one of Warren’s
clerks said, “It is clear that the issues are significant.”40
The Planned Parenthood Federation hired Yale Law School Professor Fowler V.
Harper, the veteran of Poe v. Ullman, to argue Griswold. Harper initially wanted to
frame his argument around First Amendment freedoms of speech, including the right to
give advice, as he had with Poe.41 However, “[a]fter spotting a 1962 law review article
written by Norman Redlich, he (and others working on the case) rethought this plan.”42
Redlich’s article suggests a fundamental right of privacy inherent in the Ninth
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Amendment: “The Court could hold that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments reserve to a
married couple the right to maintain the intimacy of the marital relationship without
government interference,” and that such marital intimacy qualifies as a private right
based on the intimations of privacy in the dissents for Poe v. Ullman.43
However, Harper did not discard the First Amendment claim entirely. Instead, he
reshaped his argument to incorporate three different legal arguments. In addition to
building his argument around the idea that Planned Parenthood’s free speech rights had
been infringed, he incorporated into his argument the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, asserting that those seeking advice on contraceptives had their
rights to liberty and property violated without due process of the law. Based upon
Redlich’s article, though, Harper most importantly argued for a right to marital privacy
not enumerated but allowed by the Ninth Amendment. In the end, this was to be the crux
of his argument. Before he was able to argue the case, however, Harper died. Yale Law
School professor Thomas Emerson took over Harper’s role in the case and, while
acknowledging the privacy argument, filed an amicus brief centered on the Due Process
Clause argument, maintaining that the Connecticut statute constituted an unwarranted
invasion of privacy and therefore violated due process.44
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court was preparing itself with the benefit of six amicus
curiae briefs.45 The difficulty in formulating a response to the question was identifying a
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constitutional source for its holding. “While all of the [nine] brethren believed the
Connecticut law was absolutely asinine, the tough question was whether it was
unconstitutional,”46 one political scientist has written. Unsurprisingly, then, the Justices’
7-2 holding in favor of Griswold, declaring the Connecticut statute unconstitutional,
merely reflects one point of agreement among the Justices’ differing lines of
constitutional argument. In the opinion of the Court, Justice Douglas envisions a
penumbra formed by the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, with the first eight
amendments providing “emanations” or zones of privacy that could support the holding.
Yet, he maintains that that marital privacy is particularly protected by the First
Amendment right to association stating, “We deal with a right of privacy older than the
Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school system.
Marriage…is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living,
not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.”47
Justices Goldberg, Warren and Brennan grounded their support in the Ninth
Amendment. In the notes from the Court in conference, Warren initially states, “I can’t
balance, use equal protection, or use a ‘shocking’ due process standard. I can’t accept a
privacy argument,”48 but he eventually joins with Goldberg and Brennan supporting a
doctrine that would enable privacy as a right in the future. They state that the effect of
this decision will leave available a legal path to classify difficult cases using a broad
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range of privacy liberties. It could increase areas of judicial support by applying privacy
to less cut-and-dry situations or in other hard to classify cases, which, despite their
vagueness, should be retained by the people in a democracy committed to preserving
individual liberties.49
Justices Harlan and White base their opinions in the substantive protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Harlan found that restricting the use of
contraceptives violates a value “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”50 That is, he
states that the ability to regulate one’s own sexual and family life is a liberty, but leaves
privacy out of the debate. Justice White, in concurrence, states that the issue of
overbroad legislation cannot be avoided by using a privacy argument, asserting that the
Connecticut statute was overbroad to regulate “illicit sexual relationships”51 and refusing
to apply privacy.
The two dissenters, Justices Black and Stewart, dissented on the grounds that
privacy is nowhere to be found in the Constitution, despite their claims that they were not
“anti-privatists.”52 Justice Black was the only justice to stress the fact that “‘privacy’ is a
broad, abstract and ambiguous concept,” 53 too broad to read into the words of the
Constitution. “Privacy is broader than any one amendment because several of the specific
guarantees are designed in part to protect something that might be called privacy, but
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each guarantee is also broader than privacy,”54 and should therefore be more narrowly
tailored.
Modern-day scholars agree on the gravity of Griswold’s legal impact.55 At the
time, however, it was not a watershed case. Practically, Griswold did nothing more than
declare unconstitutional Connecticut’s out-moded anti-birth control statute. However,
the constitutional principle grew between 1965 and 1973, when the Court issued its Roe
v. Wade opinion. By that time, privacy had become a fundamental part of Constitutional
doctrine. From there, it became the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut. Period
scholars disagreed on its immediate implications and emanations, an understandable
debate due to the Court’s unclear position.56 Some argued that it did not expand
Constitutional rights or fundamental rights theory, but merely continued its logical
extension of them; others, that “the role of the Court as guardian of individual rights
[was] both solidified and advanced.”57
Lacking a unified vision from the Court, legal scholars immediately postGriswold asserted that the scope of the right to privacy was relatively narrow. Some
surmised that a statute regulating the sale and manufacture of contraceptives would still
be permissible under the newly articulated privacy.58 “It [was] conceivable that in future
cases the Court [would] limit the doctrine to the marriage relationship, or even refuse to
54
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extend it beyond the precise facts of the Connecticut case”59 University of Michigan Law
School professor Paul G. Kauper noted that Griswold produced no major change in
Constitutional theory and, consistent with Bill of Rights development at the time, merely
takes the already in-place expansion of fundamental rights one small step further. It was
nothing revolutionary, but rather a reassertion of Court’s ability to protect fundamental
rights.60 Other scholars, on the other hand, noted the potential for an expansive right of
privacy, anticipating potential application of the privacy to sexual conduct outside of
marriage, family planning, abortion, electronic eavesdropping, government subpoenas,
search warrants and lie-detectors.61
The analytical confusion scholars faced was a direct result of confusion within the
Court. Even the justices were unsure about privacy’s future applications. Justice White
argued that privacy was so vague and standardless as a right that it could be expanded or
restricted at will. He warned that Douglas’ opinion would inevitably endanger rather
than strengthen the individual liberties explicitly enumerated in the Bill of Rights.62
Also, Kauper notes that while the holding itself did little more than declare the
Connecticut statute unconstitutional, its implications were great:
The larger significance of the case, however, is the contribution, if any, that it
makes to general constitutional theory respecting fundamental rights, the
relationship of these rights to the specifics of the Bill of Rights, and the standard
to be employed by the Court in passing on the constitutionality of legislation
allegedly impinging on fundamental rights.63
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Despite legal commentators’ disagreements about the implications of the holding,
scholars agree that what resulted from Griswold was a legally, precedentially and
theoretically ambiguous concept of privacy which had questionable grounding in the
Constitution. In 1965, legal theorist Robert D. McKay summarized the confusion well:
Except for the fourth amendment holdings, the talk about privacy rights was not
supported with judgments in vindication of privacy rights until Griswold…. The
right of privacy is not to be limited narrowly to the facts of Griswold, but is meant
to foretell broad protection for the dignity of man and the inviolability of his
rights of personality…. Far more important than the result on the narrowly
special facts of Griswold is the question whether the principle there announced
can have these important collateral consequences. It is certainly more than a bare
possibility.64
The Court struggled largely with privacy’s implications over the next eight years.
By Roe v. Wade, it had churned meaning out of privacy in a number of areas. The Court
cited Griswold’s privacy principle in eighteen opinions in the period between Griswold
and Roe. However, the majority did not consistently rely upon Griswold every time it
might have been used.65 Particularly in light of its changing personnel, the Court was
bitterly divided on the existence or derivation of a constitutional right to privacy. What
follows is a summary of the court cases which refer to the newly articulated right of
privacy between Griswold and Roe.
Between the Landmarks
Immediately following Griswold, the Court attempted to define privacy more
specifically through case law. In doing so, the Court generally contained its discussion of
privacy to cases involving criminals and deviants: drunk drivers, corrupt officials,
robbers, gamblers, gangsters, murderers, and sexual deviants. This would become vital
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in mobilizing public opinion during Roe v. Wade, as it was the first landmark case to link
privacy rights and everyday wives and daughters.
The Court saw its first opportunity to define privacy rights less than one year after
Griswold. In Schmerber v. California (1966), the defendant was hospitalized after a
drunk driving accident. Medical personnel suspected that he was intoxicated, and a
doctor took a urine sample and blood test without the patient’s consent, which police
submitted as evidence. Schmerber sued to suppress the evidence as a warrantless search,
also claiming that his constitutional right to privacy had been violated. In a 5-4 decision,
the Court held that Schmerber’s constitutional rights were not violated and that the right
to privacy did not apply to this situation. Justice Douglas dissented on the grounds that
the conviction violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as
established in Griswold, and that the compulsory blood test clearly invaded the right of
privacy protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.66
Later that year, the Court heard a case regarding secret taping of private
conversations. In Osborn v. United States, a police officer submitted a tape recording of
an attorney bribing a jury, taken while the office was undercover, without authorization
from the District Court. The attorney claimed his right to privacy had been violated. The
Court held in a 7-1 decision that no rights at all had been violated. The majority based its
opinion on the Fourth Amendment’s explicit permissions, neglecting to acknowledge any
privacy emanations. Again citing Griswold, however, Justice Douglas again dissented on
the grounds that Osborn’s right to privacy as granted by the penumbra of the Bill of
Rights was violated. He expressed concern for the implications of the liberties the state
took with Osborn: “We are rapidly entering the age of no privacy, where everyone is
66
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open to surveillance at all times; where there are no secrets from government. The
aggressive breaches of privacy by the Government increase by geometric proportions.
Wiretapping and ‘bugging’ run rampant, without effective judicial or legislative
control.”67
At this point, the Court had explicitly denied privacy rights in the Fourth
Amendment field—searches, seizures and wiretapping. However, Justice Douglas was
quickly establishing a theme of unflinching support for the right to privacy, fearful about
government infringements on individual rights. When forced to evaluate one
fundamental right over another, though, even Justice Douglas placed free speech
protection above privacy protection. In its next privacy case, the Court would deny
privacy rights in the field of libel.
The following year, the Court heard Time, Inc. v. Hill.68 In this libel case, the
plaintiff, a playwright and public figure, brought suit against Life magazine, claiming that
the magazine had violated his right to privacy under New York law when it published a
slanderous article about a personal family event. A 6-3 Court held that because he was a
public figure, the plaintiff relinquished some of his privacy rights and eventually
remanded the decision to the lower court. The majority and dissenting opinions agreed
that the New York statute would not, in most cases, allow for infraction of freedom of
speech, even at the expense of privacy rights. This holding was consistent with the
precedent set forth in New York Times v. Sullivan69 (1964), when the Court ruled that
freedoms of speech and press allow publication of criticism of official conduct.
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Criminal rights remained the most common place to see assertions of privacy. In
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden (1967), the Court again ruled against a
plaintiff’s right to privacy. In this suit, police chased a man suspected of armed robbery
into his home and seized articles of his clothing while they were there to use as evidence
against him. The Court held 8-1 that the evidence obtained in this manner without a
warrant did not violate Bill of Rights or the suspect’s privacy. Again, as the sole
dissenter, Justice Douglas argued on the grounds that the suspect’s privacy had been
violated:
This right of privacy, sustained in Griswold, is akin to the right of privacy created
by the Fourth Amendment. That there is a zone that no police can enter -- whether
in ‘hot pursuit’ or armed with a meticulously proper warrant…. I would adhere to
them and leave with the individual the choice of opening his private effects (apart
from contraband and the like) to the police or keeping their contents a secret and
their integrity inviolate. The existence of that choice is the very essence of the
right of privacy.70
Also in 1967, the Court heard Katz v. United States, the first case after Griswold in which
the Court voted to grant personal privacy rights. In this case, the defendant was
convicted of transmitting wagering information via public telephone by evidence
obtained with a wiretap on the public phone booth. The tap was placed without a
warrant. Contrary to its previous trend, the Court held that such wiretapping was
unconstitutional because one carries a right to privacy on his person rather than on his
location. This acknowledgement of a right to privacy stemmed only from the Fourth
Amendment’s emanations and neglected the Fourteenth Amendment. As the lone
dissenter, Justice Black vehemently deplores the Court:
Thus, by arbitrarily substituting the Court's language, designed to protect privacy,
for the Constitution's language, designed to protect against unreasonable searches
70
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and seizures, the Court has made the Fourth Amendment its vehicle for holding
all laws violative of the Constitution which offend the Court's broadest concept of
privacy.71
That the anti-privacy dissent cites a standard Court acknowledgement of privacy at least
in the Fourth Amendment indicates a general consensus on the existence of privacy rights
within the Constitution. This indicates that the Court does acknowledge and seek to
protect a right of privacy. It had the opportunity to prove this support in a landmark case
two years later.
In Stanley v. Georgia (1969), the Court grappled with privacy and obscenity. In
this case, police obtained “obscene” material from the defendant’s apartment while in
search of materials implicating him in bookmaking activity and arrested him for violating
a Georgia statute prohibiting the possession of obscene materials. In writing a unanimous
opinion, Justice Marshall held that the statute violated First and Fourteenth Amendment
protections of obscenity. “For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very
limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy.”
Three justices concurred, holding that the seizure violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, but did not include a right to privacy argument. Though, they did not deny
the majority’s privacy argument, indicating a latent agreement with the opinion.72 This
decision is still viewed as a groundbreaking event for privacy rights, as it was the first
after Griswold in which every justice acknowledged an individual’s right to privacy.
The Supreme Court saw a spike in privacy-related cases in 1971. During this
year, the Court faced multiple pressures to recognize privacy, particularly from Justice
Douglas. After the Court’s back-to-back pro-privacy decisions, it ruled consistently with
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its previous warrantless search cases, and refused to extend its newly codified concept of
privacy to a scenario in which they had previously denied it. In Wyman, Commissioner
of New York Department of Social Services v. James (1971), the defendant was denied
government aid when she refused to allow a caseworker to visit her house. She claimed
the visit was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court ruled
against her, and most importantly it articulated that the Fourth Amendment can exist as
insurance against unreasonable searches and seizures but does not necessarily imply a
fundamental right to privacy.73
The Court followed up with another holding constraining privacy in United States
v. Vuitch (1971). Here, the plaintiff challenged a District of Columbia statute making it
illegal to receive an abortion unless continuing the pregnancy would result in harm to the
mother. While the majority intimated that the lower courts did not give close enough
scrutiny to the statute based on precedent set forth by Griswold and refused to consider
abortion a privacy issue, Justice Douglas dissented, stating that “[a]bortion touches
intimate affairs of the family, of marriage, of sex, which in Griswold v. Connecticut, we
held to involve rights associated with several express constitutional rights and which are
summed up in ‘the right of privacy.’”74 He was ahead of his time in his opinion, taking
stand in a position the Court would soon follow.
Again, in Palmer v. Thompson, Mayor of the City of Jackson (1971), in which
Justice Douglas argued for privacy, the Court ignored the contentious idea. After federal
litigation had declared unconstitutional a Mississippi town operating four swimming
pools for whites and one for blacks, the town closed every swimming pool. Black
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plaintiffs sued for the town to reopen desegregated pools. The opinion was devoid of
mention of privacy or Griswold save for Justice Douglas’s dissent, which does not
embrace a privacy argument but nonetheless states: “Thus the right of privacy, which we
honored in Griswold, may not be overturned by a majority vote at the polls, short of a
constitutional amendment.”75 By this time, Justice Douglas had begun to see privacy at
every turn, whenever rights were implicated, seemingly, including in the Fourteenth
Amendment.
When the Court issued its opinion for Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), it
recognized (though did not employ) a right to privacy for only the third time since
Griswold. In this case, a murder suspect’s wife turned over his guns and clothing without
knowing her husband was being investigated for murder. The police used the evidence to
gain a warrant from a biased magistrate, and confiscated the accused’s vehicle, using it as
evidence gain the eventual conviction. Though the majority did not rely on privacy in its
opinion, it held that because the magistrate was biased, the evidence was impermissible.
In the dissent, though, Chief Justice Warren introduces privacy. “The broad, abstract, and
ambiguous concept of ‘privacy’ is now unjustifiably urged as a comprehensive substitute
for the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures,’”76
regarding the Court’s skewed interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
In 1972, the Court faced Eisenstadt v. Baird. In a key holding, the majority
overturned the conviction of a Connecticut man who distributed contraceptives without a
doctor’s license. The majority first stated that privacy is not applied to a married couple
as an independent unit, but rather to each individual within the couple. The opinion
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concluded with the memorable statement, “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child [italics in original].”77 Privacy’s shift from applying to a married couple
or a family to an individual person was an extremely important precedent. It set the stage
for a discussion of privacy rights as applicable to both individual partners within a
marriage. This enabled discussion of women’s and men’s independent privacy rights. In
other words, while the Court maintained a relatively closed approach to privacy in the
years following Griswold, this opinion opened the door for a much broader range of
applications—like abortion.
In 1973 when the Court faced its last pre-Roe privacy-related case, the Court
again turned its back on the emerging right. Couch v. United States involved a
restaurateur whose accountant refused to disclose her tax records during an IRS
investigation, and, after receiving a summons, transferred the documents to an attorney.
The restaurateur claimed disclosing her private documents would be incriminating and
was therefore free from doing so under the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court
upheld her conviction on the grounds that once she gave up her taxes to an accountant,
she forfeited her rights to privacy and against self-incrimination; the transfer from
accountant to attorney was void as it had transpired after the state issued its summons.
The two dissenters, including Justice Douglas maintained that one’s privacy extends to
himself, his property and his documents; it protects people rather than places based on the
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Fourth Amendment.78 Following is an analysis of the cases and their impact on privacy
principles.
Privacy Defined
The Warren Court Fumbles the Concept
Immediately following the legally muddled and doctrinally confused Griswold,
and with the Griswold membership of the Court still intact, the Court had the opportunity
to more clearly articulate its position on privacy. In the year following the Griswold
opinion, the Court issued two decisions denying the potentially vast extensions of privacy
rights. Despite its liberal tendencies, it took a rather strict constructionist approach,
refusing to acknowledge penumbras and emanations, and instead granted only those
rights expressly enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Justice Douglas dissented on privacy
grounds, even though the majority opinion did not engage the idea of privacy. It was not
until late 1967 when a majority opinion again applied the Griswold privacy principle to
protect an entire person and his or her conversations, rather than a place.79 While this
was not a direct claim to a right to privacy, it reinforced that the Fourth Amendment
created a zone of privacy. By the time the Court issued its Katz opinion, it had
appropriated the “right of privacy” as defined by Griswold v. Connecticut into the regular
syntax of its opinions. It was no longer a parenthetical remark, off-handed citation or
footnote reference. While Justice Douglas incorporated the right to privacy in his
previous dissents, this was the first case in which the right to privacy was a central
argument for both the majority and the dissent. In other words, Court members did not
discuss the emanations from the Bill of Rights, but instead engaged privacy directly. The
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existence of a right to privacy was no longer in question; the question remained, however,
as to how to define and apply it since in these cases, the Court had neither defined
privacy nor set a uniform standard by which it could be applied.
Interestingly, earlier that year in Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court argued that the
defendant, a public personality, had a right to privacy but that it had not been violated.
Perhaps because the Court did not have to defend or define the defendant’s privacy right,
but merely stated that it existed but was not violated, it was easier to include in the
opinion as fundamental.
The Burger Court Attempts a Retreat
When Chief Justice Warren announced his intent to retire in 1968, the Court had
already seen four cases which acknowledged privacy in some way. Warren hoped to
continue this trend. Suspecting that Richard Nixon would become the next President of
the United States, and hoping for a liberal replacement, Chief Justice Earl Warren
announced his intent to retire while Lyndon B. Johnson was still in office. It was not to
be. Johnson’s nomination of his friend, Abe Fortas, stalled in the election-year politics of
1968; presidential-hopeful Richard Nixon went to great lengths to ensure that Fortas was
not confirmed as Chief Justice. Nixon and his political cohorts initiated a mudslinging
campaign about “cronyism” between Fortas and then President Lyndon Johnson. When
Fortas was not approved to the position, Johnson tried several other routes, but Nixon and
his followers thwarted them all. In fact, during his presidential campaign, Nixon
explicitly stated that as President he would appoint strict constructionist judges and ones
who would not “encroach on areas belonging to Congress and the President,” and that he
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wanted to restore order to the United States.80 As a result, Johnson’s presidency ended
before he could successfully install a new Chief Justice.
After Nixon was elected, he continued to make his intentions for the Court
explicit. In his 1968 presidential acceptance speech, he stated:
Tonight it’s time for some honest talk about the problem of order in the United
States. Let us always respect, as I do, our courts and those who serve on them,
but let us also recognize that some of our courts in their decisions have gone too
far in weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces in this country.81
Leaving little room for misinterpretation, Nixon publicly announced his goals for the new
Supreme Court. Despite this, Earl Warren still intended to retire; he issued his official
letter of resignation in 1969 during Nixon’s first term as president, giving Nixon his first
chance to realize his vision of a stricter, more conservative court.
Nixon nominated Warren Burger, a judge from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
Nixon saw Burger as the ringmaster to lead a counterrevolution against Warren’s liberal
policies. He was a renowned dissenter on the “famously liberal” United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. Perhaps in response to the judicial and political
mayhem during Johnson’s lame duck period, Congress approved Burger with only three
dissenting votes.
Responding to the “cronyism” scandal, Justice Fortas announced his retirement
later in 1969. After two failed appointees, Nixon discovered what he thought a suitable
candidate. Harry Blackmun was a longtime friend of Warren Burger and a judge on the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Blackmun was moderate on civil rights, conservative
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on criminal rights and civil liberties, and an advocate of judicial restraint and
conservativism.82
In 1971, Justices Black and Harlan also announced their retirements, and Nixon
had two more opportunities to appoint his ideal justice. Of the two, Black was a stronger
liberal and supporter of privacy rights, while Harlan was a voice of conservativism and
opponent of privacy rights. Nixon first appointed and had confirmed William Rehnquist,
a staunch conservative, segregationist, and strict constructionist. The Senate also
confirmed Lewis Powell, a more moderate conservative who supported gradual change
and did not support civil rights orcivil liberties leaders.83 During Nixon’s first three years
in office, then, three consistent liberals and supporters of privacy rights and one
conservative had been replaced by four conservatives who were thought to be opponents
of a broad conception of personal liberties.
Many scholars agree that Burger’s court provided a more closed version of
Warren’s policies. It was stronger on law and order issues and was much less apt to grant
liberties without clear constitutional, precedential, or doctrinal grounding. However, one
legal analyst disagrees.
There has indeed been change [in the Court’s direction]. However, the
importance of maintaining earlier rulings has been under-estimated, areas of
noticeable continuity have been missed, and areas where the Burger Court has
advanced along the paths first marked by Earl Warren and his brethren have been
set aside. Growth has been ignored, while the amount of erosion has been played
up.84
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The trend of reproductive privacy rights showed particular certainty. Privacy would not
be extended into criminal areas, to be sure, but the Burger Court remained relatively
consistent with the Warren Court’s acceptance of sexual privacy cases (sexual and
marital privacy, reproductive freedoms, and obscenity) into its docket. The Burger Court
focused on pulling back on criminal rights, asserting its position as a “law and order”
court,85 but Nixon’s ambitions were only partially realized. This “law and order” Court
would eventually open the flood gates for public confusion and turmoil regarding its
privacy rulings as evidenced by the cases citing the Griswold privacy precedent. As the
Court refused to hand down an overarching definition of privacy, it dealt with each issue
independently. It handled each issue as it came up rather than upholding a vague and
unenforceable sweeping definition. It predicated its decisions on the particular
circumstances or issues within a case. Still, the Court was reticent to extend the right of
privacy to criminals and deviants. The majority of privacy-related cases it took into its
docket dealt with criminals and deviants, but despite Justice Douglas’ ability to see
privacy issues in myriad other cases, the majority frequently acknowledged its existence
but denied its relevance.
Nonetheless, all of the cases dealing with privacy issues between Griswold and
Coolidge v. New Hampshire cite Griswold as the legal foundation for fundamental
privacy. Despite that a right of privacy was not explicitly written into the Constitution,
the Griswold opinion was the first to give it legal salience in the Bill of Rights. But by
the time the Court issued its opinion on Coolidge v. New Hampshire, it had stopped citing
Griswold and simply relied on the common understanding that privacy was a
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fundamental right. That common understanding would be taken to an extreme in Roe v.
Wade and Doe v. Bolton (1973).
Roe v. Wade
Very soon after Griswold there emerged a clear debate about what a right to
privacy in contraception meant for abortion services. Pre-Roe scholars debated whether
the privacy argument initiated by Griswold would hold water in the abortion debate.86
Cyril Means, a key participant in the formation of the Roe argument stated, “no
Griswold-style constitutional challenge to abortion statutes had any credible chance of
success…. Judges are much more likely to accept a historical argument” than any
privacy-oriented reasoning that a woman’s individual choice was a fundamental liberty.87
However, in the late 1960s when Planned Parenthood, the National Organization for
Women (NOW), and the American Civil Liberties Union’s (ACLU) Association for the
Study of Abortions (ASA) began formulating the ideal abortion case (as Planned
Parenthood had done with Griswold), privacy was a key feature of their thinking, but it
was still not treated as a fundamental right.
Later, in 1969 after the Hot Springs ASA conference, obstetrics and gynecology
professor Edmund Overstreet stated that Griswold “is being quoted increasingly
frequently as a manifesto which points the right of the individual woman to decide
against pregnancy even though abortion is involved.”88 That same year, Norma
McCorvey, a poor, unwed pregnant woman sought an abortion in Texas. Her physician
refused to help her under a Texas statute prohibiting abortions, and after visiting a Dallas
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abortion clinic which McCorvey felt was dangerous, she sought legal help. McCorvey
became Jane Roe, and her attorneys brought the class action suit Roe et al. v. Wade to the
Supreme Court.
Despite that the Court in Vuitch refused to consider any privacy arguments based
on Griswold, Roe attorneys, with little insight as to how the Court would accept a similar
argument brought under different circumstances, still brought the case under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s implicit right to privacy. 89 Medical organizations like the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists filed amicus briefs emphasizing
the association and privacy rights a woman has with her doctor. Planned Parenthood and
the American Public Health Association also filed briefs advocating a privacy-centered
abortion defense.90
Particularly interesting are the ways in which litigants brought privacy arguments
before the Court and the ways in which the Court applied them. The Roe attorneys
centered their arguments on Douglas’ “penumbras” theory articulated in Griswold; they
tried to base it in as many amendments as they could, including the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth. First, the First Amendment protects one’s freedom to
associate with whomever she chooses, including her physician. Next, attorneys
Weddington and Coffee argued that limiting abortion rights invades the woman’s and
physician’s rights to privacy in the medical office, as protected by the Fourth
Amendment. Also citing Griswold, the attorneys further asserted that the Fifth
Amendment’s creation of zones of privacy protected women’s bodies from government
intrusion. Further, the attorneys strayed from the Griswold outline and included a
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“poignant” defense in the Eighth Amendment, arguing that denying a woman an abortion
was cruel and unusual punishment. Despite their reticence about using an unfamiliar
Ninth Amendment argument, Coffee and Weddington also cited Justices Douglas and
Goldberg’s use of the Ninth Amendment to create a general right to privacy.
Interestingly, the two attorneys acknowledged the argument that denying a woman’s right
to control and privacy over her body was denying her life, liberty and property under the
Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but omitted it from their oral
arguments. They chose instead to use it as a fall back contestation.91
Scholars agree that the oral arguments in Roe did very little to influence the
justices’ decisions. Likely, they had formulated their opinions before the case was heard.
The principal question was one which the justices had already considered. The justices
had only to decide in which Amendment they would ground their opinions.92 Similar to
Griswold, the Court based its legal reasoning in many different places. The Court held
that “a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does
exist under the Constitution.”93 Because this core principle was clear, Roe was written
and signed by all the liberal justices and three of Nixon’s prized conservative appointees.
Writing the opinion of the Court, Blackmun found the right to privacy inherent in two
places. First, he saw it in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty
derived from the Due Process Clause. Second, he found it the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Amendments, though he never explicitly states where the concept actually exists.
Essentially, the heart and soul of Blackmun’s opinion lies in his statement that the right to
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privacy may be found somewhere, but wherever it is, “it is broad enough to encompass a
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate a pregnancy.”94 Ultimately, he intimates
that the existence of a right to privacy is not in question, eradicating Griswold’s
skepticism about the existence of the right, at all. Only Justices White and Rehnquist
dissented, on two grounds. First, White and Rehnquist argued that abortion laws should
be left to the states. Second, without addressing the existence of a right to privacy, White
complained that “the court had simply announced a new right without scarcely any
reason or authority for its action.” He does not deny privacy, but instead criticized the
means by which the majority acknowledged the right. Rehnquist also responded, “the
privacy right in Roe, whatever its dimensions, had little or nothing in common with the
Court’s earlier privacy cases.” Like White, Rehnquist does not deny the existence of a
right to privacy, but rather that it was misapplied in this case.
What resulted from the holding was that the vision of privacy set forth in Roe was
significantly expanded from the one asserted in Griswold.95 One legal scholar at the time
stated that Roe clearly was “at least far more explicit than Griswold in its protection of
the autonomy interest in privacy.”96 Implicit in the words of Griswold was the notion
that legislation regulating or prohibiting the sale and manufacture of contraceptives
would be permissible. In Roe, however, the Court elevated privacy to the level
requisitioning strict scrutiny, asserting that the states must have a compelling interest in
infringing upon privacy rights. That is to say, however restrained the Burger court was in
other areas, it was nearly as activist as the Warren court when it came to reproductive
privacy. The Burger Court produced, in Roe v. Wade, a 7-2 opinion in favor of a solid
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and unambiguous right to privacy. It now had judicial support, significant policy content,
and implications beyond the curious law invalidated in Griswold.
Conclusion
This development would prove to be essential in the solidification of privacy
rights in the 1970s. Because privacy gained a strong foothold in legal thought during the
decade following Griswold, it gathered significant momentum in the greater social and
political discourse, with Roe v. Wade as the catalyst that thrust Court-conceived privacy
into the mainstream. While non-legal discussions largely neglected the legal conceptions
of privacy, Constitutional privacy remained a constant force, chipping away at the
retaining wall that kept back the flood of privacy understanding, activity, regulation, and
discussion. That privacy had become solidified in one branch of America contributed to
its strength to break the dam in later years.
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Chapter 3: The Johnson Administration
Though the Court after 1965 was toying with its newly minted legal concept of
privacy, that right was still misunderstood and occasionally ignored in other areas of
society, particularly during President Johnson’s administration. Yet, other conceptions of
privacy remained latent in the undercurrents and deeper consciousness of America. This
chapter details the political and social development of privacy during Johnson’s term in
the White House as a part of a wider attempt to account for the multi-layered codification
of privacy in later years. It was during this time that privacy began to emerge as a
political issue as well as a legal one,97 although it was emerging out of an ambiguous
concept that was as difficult for the Court to articulate as it was to regulate. While it
might seem that privacy would easily delineate into simple origins and foundational
principles, its pre-1970 history was actually quite complex. It would be difficult to credit
any one event or agency with “starting” to break the privacy dam in American society;
cracks seemed to surface from many points at the same time. However muddled, these
intertwined developments are essential to help understand the flood of privacy in the
public and political eye during later years.
While the Court sat in one corner intrigued by its new conceptual tool, the elected
branches were awakening to its possibilities. Each handled privacy in a way that dealt
almost exclusively with criminals and deviants. The President took advantage of the
technological advances that allowed him to gain political leverage by spying on his
opponents and political enemies, but publicly he championed personal privacy
protections. Congress intensified its committee work to calm the rumblings of
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discontentment with spying and information collection. The media, for its part, helped by
the executive and legislative branches, covered privacy developments, reacted to events,
and provoked awareness and activity. Each equally-footed player slowly expanded their
individual cracks. By the end of Johnson’s presidency, these cracks would begin to
coalesce, ready to crumble before the concept of personal privacy.
In the last corner sat the Federal Bureau of Investigation, unfazed by the political
concept. When the FBI transformed in 1956, from an institution working to protect the
public from communism into a seemingly out-of-control agency that was endangering
public peace and security by breaching assumed rules of privacy, privacy rose from the
depths of social awareness and into the limelight. If not for the radical and superfluous
FBI investigations, it would be difficult to see a substantial first crack in the privacy
issue.
That is, while Johnson entered the presidency with some concern about personal
privacy, his political eye began to shift toward it both by invading it and working to
protect it, but only after the FBI began wielding its investigatory power in a manner that
alarmed Johnson, Congress and the media. From Johnson’s response to the FBI, the
media ran away with perceived governmental intrusions on the public’s privacy.
Congress responded contemporaneously by organizing committees, conducting hearings
and proposing legislation to protect individuals’ privacy. Once Congress published its
committee hearing findings and began to speak out against privacy infringements, the
public became more concerned. In response to the public’s concern, President Johnson
and Congress strengthened their work to protect personal privacy, creating an upward
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spiral of privacy discourse. In other words, what began as a powerful federal agency
using its power to invade domestic privacy eventually became a national political issue.
It seems, interestingly, that different groups were concerned with different aspects
of privacy. The general public was becoming more aware of privacy because of its fears
of electronic intrusions from the government. The average man was most concerned that
his phone conversations were being listened to. The government, on the other hand, was
more attuned to it because of its limited ability to act against criminals, which conflicted
with its desire to match public outcry against eavesdropping and tapping. It could not be
strict on law and order while frivolously granting privacy rights. The Supreme Court was
becoming more aware of privacy largely because of its legal ambiguity in sexuality and
marriage cases. While Congress and the public were more concerned with the salient
privacy issues that affected everyday people, the Court was concerned with its obfuscated
version of privacy, centering on intrusive statutes that were rarely enforced and were
therefore not a source of public concern. This multidirectional dialog played
significantly into gaining privacy national force in later years.
Privacy Invaders: The Federal Bureau of Instigation
As far back as the 1920s, a handful of government agencies had used various
mechanisms such as illegal wiretaps to combat perceived threats to American stability.
With the rise of new technologies like wiretaps and computers, numerous government
agencies began collecting and cataloging information on employees, other government
agents, and regular citizens. The more aggressive investigators included the Treasury
Department, the IRS, and the Post Office. Yet, with its increasing autonomy and power,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was responsible for the worst intrusions on
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citizens’ private information. Its autonomy and extensive use of surveillance both
exploited Americans’ fears. First, the domestic enemy of crime had increased in America
after World War II leading to political demand for protection. Second, the external threat
both took advantage of Americans’ fears and led many to desire more zealous FBI action.
Due to the prowess of FBI director and public relations genius J. Edgar Hoover, the
public was particularly enamored with the FBI, which would enjoy decades of clout as
the front-line defense against both threats.
Congress initially handled these matters. But, by the early 1950s, internal
security and investigation matters were “to be removed from political, and particularly
legislative, arenas….”98 An executive pronouncement known as The Truman Directive
explicitly granted the FBI control of “investigative work in matters relating to espionage,
sabotage, subversive activities and related matters,”99 but did not define any of these
terms. The FBI took the directive as a go ahead for drastic internal security measures and
intrusions on Americans’ privacy.100 Initially the public supported this behavior. Hoover
acted as a guardian and was politically savvy in crafting his public message by
emphasizing that the elected had the power to “curb crime by getting tough,” and that the
Supreme Court and the Justice Department were to blame for the increase in crime.”101
To be sure, Hoover used sophisticated strategies. He encouraged the public to view his
activities as patriotic and politically impartial, claiming to protect their personal
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privacy.102 Interestingly, the American Civil Liberties Union initially supported this
power transfer. Communism, it felt, was more of a threat to civil liberties than FBI
power. As such, ubiquitous fear of communism prohibited any widespread critique of
investigation practices.
In addition to relinquishing its investigation duties, Congress designated
additional resources for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. However, as the FBI began
to adopt unscrupulous or illegal investigation practices, Congress became worried that it
would begin to infringe on citizens’ First Amendment rights. Soon after, Congress cut
many of its ties with FBI; meanwhile, the FBI increased its vigor in seeking out spies and
Communists.103 The FBI’s prowess and relentlessness was successful largely due to J.
Edgar Hoover, who could exact such loyalty because, during the 1950s and 1960s, there
was no outside review of his policies.104 By 1964, one author has argued, the FBI could
be said to have “passed through and beyond the model of a political police,” viewing
itself as responsible for “disrupting the activities of indigenous American groups, in
particular, the Ku Klux Klan, that had no connection either to the Communist party or to
the agency of a foreign power.”105
For example, their “Cointelpro” (counterintelligence program) mission was total
reporting of financial information, phone records, and political affiliations, amongst other
things. Cointelpro was based only on the approval of the FBI director, and operated
without congressional oversight. The FBI was also adamant about demonstrating its
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discoveries under Cointelpro. For example, it sent anonymous postcards to 6,000 Klan
members stating such things as, “Klansman, trying to hide your identity behind your
sheet? You received this—someone knows who you are.”106 What’s more, Hoover also
turned on the labor movement, African Americans and pro-civil rights groups contending
that “The infiltration, exploitation, and control of the Negro population has long been a
[Communist] party goal and is one of its principal goals today.”107
Autonomy had other forms. For example, the FBI exempted itself from rules and
regulations of the Civil Service Commission, an agency intended to arbitrate and oversee
the public sector. The FBI would occasionally leak information to the press and fabricate
stories to further its agenda. As it took increasingly extralegal approaches to
investigations, the FBI’s infractions became egregious: spying, ordering wiretaps on
anyone, particularly government and high profile officials, and taking records without
consent or knowledge. Thus, “it was only a matter of time before liberals and their
sometime friends—like Senator Sam J. Ervin [D., N.C.]—with strict constitutionalist
leanings would recognize the new internal security environment and take steps to contain
it.”108
By the end of the 1960s, the FBI had immunized itself from outside scrutiny with
blackmail and unscrupulous practices. Hoover flatly refused to turn over FBI records to
the National Archives and destroyed many other records. The FBI was also having
trouble retaining employees because of the nature of the personal and private information
it kept on them. Despite the great lengths Hoover took to ensure that details of the FBI’s
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behavior were not leaked to the news media, stating that information needed to remain
confidential to protect citizens’ personal privacy,109 major national news media
publications picked up on this behavior. The enormous amount of illegal surveillance
came to the public light when an illegal investigate government agencies FBI bug was
discovered in a Las Vegas gambler’s office. “This led to a series of court-ordered
revelations of illegal federal surveillance involving some 50 or more cases,”110 which set
back federal surveillance practices until Richard Nixon took over the White House. The
Nation bluntly but not inaccurately stated: “Under Hoover’s administration the FBI has
assumed practically unlimited investigative powers. It can investigate almost anyone it
wants to investigate, by almost any methods it sees fit.”111
As the press tapped into FBI misbehavior, the FBI became vulnerable to political
attack. First, it could exercise hegemony over internal security matters only as long as it
maintained its liberal constituency. But as the relationship with its liberal allies eroded,
so too did its staying power. Second, its staying power depended on controlling and
keeping its files secret from the public eye; as long as the public did not know what they
were doing, they were free to do it. When these files were leaked to the mass media, its
insularity was impaired. Last, the agency’s reputation was closely tied to its director.
When the public began to see Hoover as a threat rather than a protector, it also turned on
the FBI.
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By 1968, the FBI had decreased its investigations and dossiers. Three factors had
influenced Hoover’s decision to curtail his surveillance and intrusive behavior. First,
Hoover had become such an outlier in the Justice Department that he was pushed into
compliance with the department’s pressure. Second, the 1968 Crime bill provided that
FBI directors after Hoover would have to be appointed by the president and approved by
the Senate.112 Last, “shifts in legal and public opinion made it more dangerous for the
Bureau to continue many intelligence-gathering methods of the past….”113 With Hoover
and the FBI seeming to shape up, the government would at last have the unobstructed
ability to act on these new privacy issues.
An Unusual Relationship: LBJ’s Duality
If anyone in a position of power was aware of the FBI’s practices, it was President
Lyndon B. Johnson. During this time, Johnson also engaged dishonest behavior. While
he publicly urged more protections for citizens’ privacy, he was eavesdropping and
snooping behind closed doors. While he was vice-president, Johnson was told “more
government secrets than any of his predecessors,”114 and used the willing FBI for
political espionage. Like some of his predecessors, “he comfortably used it to gain
information on other rivals…;”115 he requested and received over twelve hundred files
concerning the activities of his political foes.116
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Johnson also sought to appear strict on criminal justice and promote an
atmosphere of law and order, which complicated his stance on privacy. This interesting
duality resulted in part from Johnson’s unique relationship with J. Edgar Hoover. The
two were close friends. Johnson commissioned Hoover to “covertly—and, of course,
illegally,”117 investigate threats of communism and to the safety of him and his family.
Though Hoover worked to protect Johnson, he also gathered blackmail material on
Johnson.118 Therefore, Hoover had the power both to protect LBJ from physical harm
and political mudslinging, and to destroy LBJ. Johnson did not leave this power
unchecked. His awareness of Hoover’s illegal behavior gave him leverage against
Hoover. One scholar puts it simply: “Johnson and Hoover seem to have developed a
cozy, though uneasy, relationship: two men of power courting, exploiting, and
mistrusting each other.”119 This would create yet another leak of privacy issues and,
eventually, the scandal that broke the dam.
LBJ also privately condoned the FBI’s investigations of the Ku Klux Klan, but
publicly opposed them. To the public, the only reason for an invasion of privacy was to
protect society from deviants and criminals. A series of incidents portrayed LBJ to the
public as a pillar of personal privacy protections. In 1964, President Johnson defended
congressional action to investigate government agencies and in 1965 he announced a ban
on federal agencies wiretapping without a warrant. Also in 1965, Johnson issued several
memoranda expressing his distaste for eavesdropping and his firm commitment to the
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right of privacy.120 Additionally, at new Attorney General Ramsey Clark’s induction,
Johnson departed from his prepared text to highlight their mutual determination to end
governmental wiretapping and eavesdropping, stating, “Every man should know that his
conversations, his correspondence and his personal life are truly private.”121 Two years
later in his State of the Union address, Johnson recited a well-received passage: “We
should protect what Justice Brandeis called the ‘right most valued by civilized men’ – the
right of privacy. We should outlaw all wire-tapping—public and private—wherever and
whenever it occurs, except when the security of the nation is at stake—and only then with
the strictest safeguards.”122 Congress and the public were fairly quick to respond to
Johnson’s encouragement of privacy protections, but the media, now aware of his
hypocrisy regarding privacy intrusions, honed in on them. The grave FBI privacy
infractions compiled with executive abuses of power prompted significant media
attention. Johnson’s personal investigations and public façade advocating privacy
protection sent mixed signals from the White House on how exactly the rest of the
country should approach invasions of privacy. Once the press became more heavily
involved, it left little room for further public confusion, forming yet another crack in the
privacy dam.
The Media
Elite authors, intellectuals, and journalists have sometimes seen more clearly, and
earlier than others, the privacy issues at stake in their future. Already in 1948, George
Orwell foretold of a world under constant surveillance from the government and
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consigned to the futility of resisting “Big Brother.”123 In Orwell’s wake, writers
published a litany of books and articles exploring privacy. While few foresaw a world as
extreme as Orwell’s, technology and privacy were represented in a “literature of alarm”
that was instrumental in placing these issues into the public’s imagination. These works
included fiction like Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1966), and non-fiction books
like Samuel Dash, Richard Schwartz, and Robert Knowlton’s The Eavesdroppers (1959),
Myron Brenton’s The Privacy Invaders (1964), Vance Packard’s The Naked Society
(1965), Alan Westin’s Privacy and Freedom (1967), and Jerry Rosenberg’s The Death of
Privacy (1969), to name a few, greatly increased the public’s fear of privacy invasions.124
Prolific privacy writer, Alan F. Westin in particular became a main propagator in
publicizing privacy intrusions and an instigator of privacy protection movements.
By the end of the 1960s, these themes reached the wider audiences of television.
Documentary programs, such as ABC’s “Big Brother is Listening,” and NBC’s “The Big
Ear,” and PBS’s “Bugging in the Automobile World,” “Telephones and Intercoms,” and
“Out in the Open, But Not Safe,” highlighted the many ways in which citizens’ privacy
were being violated by private bodies and the government.125 While there was previous
published opposition to privacy rights, it was largely grounded in esoteric academic and
governmental language and did not actualize the public’s fears of a 1984 type world.
Rather, it largely circulated amongst academics and media elites, the majority of whom
already supported personal privacy protections. Television programs and literature
helped raise general public awareness of privacy intrusions, and another crack formed in
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the privacy dam. The percentage of the American public that was familiar with or aware
of wiretapping rose from less than 30% in 1944 to more than 60 percent in 1966. 126
Interest groups like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) published
materials to promote open dialogue about privacy policy. The ACLU worked with
computer and technology experts in the field of personal information privacy, and
worked mostly with other civil liberties advocates during the debates about passage of a
particular section of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 dealing
with privacy rights. However, because these issues remained on the congressional
agenda for years, the ACLU’s evidence did not offer an open-and-shut case. There was
still clear opposition to the ACLU’s position.127
The news media continued to contribute to raising public awareness of
eavesdropping and wiretapping. Interestingly, these opinions spanned the entire
spectrum of American political involvement, from the Nation, the New Republic, and the
New York Post, on the left to H.L. Hunt’s Life Line, U.S. News and World Report, and the
National Review on the right. The threat of federal invasion of privacy brought liberals
and conservatives to a common position.128 Westin surveyed more than 300 newspaper
editorials on electronic eavesdropping and privacy during 1964-66, finding virtually
unanimous agreement that “control measures were needed and that both private and
public-official eavesdropping had reached proportions unbearable for a free society.”129
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Contemporary databases make further inquiry into media coverage of privacy
both feasible and illuminating. I performed an additional study of attention given by the
New York Times to privacy was an historical news search of New York Times articles in
which three directions. First, the appearance of the phrase “right to privacy” or “right of
privacy” in the citation, document text, or abstract of articles every month between
January 1, 1965 and January 1, 1975 was searched.130 Second, the articles were scanned
for relevancy, discounting any biographies of individuals that mention the individual’s
love of privacy, for example. Last, the number of times the pertinent articles appeared on
the front page of the newspaper and also noted the length of the articles were noted.
The study was repeated, but searched for the appearance of the word “privacy” in
the citation or abstract. A content analysis was performed to ensure relevancy to the
study. The study was repeated one more time, but searched for the phrase “right to
privacy” or “right of privacy” in the citation or abstract during the same time period. A
content analysis was also performed in this study, but based on the search criteria, no
articles needed omission. The results below discuss press coverage of privacy between
1965 and 1970, roughly while the Johnson administration policies were taking place.
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Table 3.1—New York Times Privacy Coverage per Quarter: 1965-1969

Quarter
Jan-Mar 1965
Apr-Jun 1965
Jul-Sep 1965
Oct-Dec 1965
Jan-Mar 1966
Apr-Jun 1966
Jul-Sep 1966
Oct-Dec 1966
Jan-Mar 1967
Apr-Jun 1967
Jul-Sep 1967
Oct-Dec 1967
Jan-Mar 1968
Apr-Jun 1968
Jul-Sep 1968
Oct-Dec 1968
Jan-Mar 1969
Apr-Jun 1969
Jul-Sep 1969
Oct-Dec 1969

Number of Articles with
“Right to Privacy” or
“Right of Privacy” in text
17
25
25
19
11
17
16
29
22
18
15
20
24
25
17
15
19
21
15
33

Number of Articles with
“Right to Privacy” or
“Right of Privacy” in
Citation or Abstract
2
2
0
3
1
1
1
2
2
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
3
1
0
3

Number of Articles with
"Privacy" in abstract or
citation
15
13
9
16
6
12
13
13
14
16
11
15
16
8
11
7
15
14
7
10

The results of this study bear significantly on privacy’s chronological
development within different aspects of the government and society. Attention given
strictly to “right to privacy” issues markedly increased between 1965 and 1975. While
newspaper articles mentioning privacy in the early 1960s dealt largely with ad hoc issues
of privacy in foreign countries, biographies of people who “loved their right to privacy,”
and the “right to privacy” in real estate sales, as privacy became more of an issue both
publicly and in the courts, the newspapers depicted the shift by focusing their privacy
articles on the Court and the government’s treatment of privacy. Interestingly, the New
York Times articles approached privacy mainly from a security from wiretapping and
eavesdropping angle, and tended only to deal with marital/reproductive privacy in an
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abortion context. There was very little printed about the right to marital privacy or
familial privacy.
New York Times articles addressing the “right to privacy” or the “right of privacy”
delineate into five major thematic categories—marital privacy, familial privacy,
eavesdropping and wiretapping, obscenity, courts and individual states, the first three of
which emerged chronologically. The latter two appeared regularly throughout the time
period. First, articles covered marital privacy, which was likely a response to Griswold.
This trend was short-lived; articles focusing on governmental (CIA and FBI) wiretapping
and eavesdropping quickly replaced those dealing with the seemingly less pressing right
of marital privacy. Beginning in early 1966, privacy articles focused increasingly on FBI
and CIA intrusions on individuals. The number of wiretapping and eavesdropping
articles notably increased in 1967, likely in conjunction with Katz v. United States. With
Katz as the exception, articles only occasionally mentioned a Court nomination or state
court holding. There was little focus on the Court again until 1968. Rather, most
coverage was based on eavesdropping, perhaps because wiretapping and eavesdropping
directly affected more people than marital privacy issues. Although laws regulating
marital privacy may have had broad opposition if enforced, statutes invading marital
privacy were rarely enforced and therefore did not generate concern within the general
public. The newspapers abandoned a more specialized version of privacy, then, and
centered on actual infractions on everyday private conversations. Focus on wiretapping
and eavesdropping did not decrease, but the New York Times began including articles
about obscenity and privacy in late-1968, likely in anticipation of Stanley v. Georgia.
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Within this timeframe, the New York Times gave relatively constant attention to
courts and their members. This includes coverage of Supreme Court decisions, judicial
nominees, and judges’ ideologies. Coverage of individual states’ behavior toward
privacy agencies, committees, cases and legislation also ran consistently throughout this
period. The number of titles or citations containing the phrase “right to privacy” or “right
of privacy” increased at approximately a one-to-one ratio with the number of titles or
citations using the word “privacy.” This means that there was little distinction made
between the phrase “right to privacy” and the word “privacy,” perhaps indicating that the
press would rather have stressed privacy itself rather than the right. This could also
indicate that public consensus was that privacy was clearly a right and did not need to be
articulated as such. There was an initial spike in May and June of 1965 immediately
following the Griswold opinion. The number of articles dropped again until 1969, when
the Court released its opinion for Stanley v. Georgia.
Upon closer examination, the Court does not appear to be the only reason for
privacy coverage. Additionally, New York Times coverage seems to follow trends within
the legislature and other media. That is, coverage and peaks were initially related to
issues the Court chose for its docket, but were substantively based on which issues were
most pressing to Congress and on television. For example, the Court’s coverage of
marital privacy lasted for only three months following Griswold. On the other hand, the
New York Times latched onto governmental eavesdropping and wiretapping in tandem
with Congressional committee publications and television media interest, initially after
1966 and much more substantially after 1970. In other words, the New York Times
privacy coverage was largely reactive to both Court and political happenings. It covered
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events and ideas after they happened, and stressed the relationship between privacy
invasion and deviants. Alternatively, fiction books and television media were largely
provocative. They captured ideas before they became mainstream, which appears to have
spurred political and public reaction.
Despite the press’ vast discussion of privacy issues, the public was still largely
unmotivated to act.131 While its awareness assuredly increased, the active discourse
largely remained within the social and political elite. The early press attention failed to
turn social or political attention toward reproductive or marital privacy yet began to
increase political awareness and public attention about information and technology
privacy,132 creating new cracks and egging-on others in the dam that held back the surge
of privacy issues.
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Privacy's Appearance in The New York Times

Chart 3.1—New York Times Privacy Coverage per Quarter
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The Political Reaction
Out of the growing awareness for privacy interests, Congress worked diligently to
combat the FBI’s behavior. Liberal senators, in particular, found themselves at odds with
the FBI over personal privacy intrusions. One scholar argues that “[p]erhaps the greatest
[political] controversy during this time…centered on the issue of wiretapping and
electronic eavesdropping….”133 As a caveat, though, Congress also needed to remain
steadfast on promoting law and order views that were coalescing into a salient political
issue for upcoming elections. Polls indicate that Americans would still relinquish some
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of their privacy rights to protect them from criminal activity.134 To the public, privacy
was a right granted to everyone but criminals and deviants. Public opinion and the broad
law and order views Congress was coalescing into a salient electoral issue complicated
Congress’ position as an advocate for non-criminal privacy protections. Although they
acknowledged privacy as a value needing regulation, policymakers were unsure about
how to legislate it given the conflicts between personal demands and societal good.
The policy process began with an emphasis on the value of privacy, and much of
the policy debate was framed in terms of an individual interest—privacy—in
conflict with a social interest—government efficiency, law enforcement, and an
honest work force…. Missing from the debates was an explicit recognition of the
social importance of privacy.135
Policymakers therefore faced conflicting demands between calls for stronger privacy
protections and the public’s right to know about criminal behavior and governmental
activity.136
Still, in 1964, Senator Edward Long’s (D-Mo.,) Senate Subcommittee on
Administrative Practices and Procedures, also known as the Long Committee, began
hearings about federal intrusions and surveillances, tapping and eavesdropping. While
the Long Committee investigated the Treasury Department, the IRS, and the Post Office,
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it avoided the FBI in its first year,137 wanting to begin by taking on smaller, less
powerful agencies. Still, they found pitifully little hard evidence that the government had
engaged in worrying behavior, and when asked, departments such as the General
Accounting Office fabricated responses or avoided the questioning. Between 1964 and
1966, as the above study indicates, the media began the Committee’s work, giving its
findings some front-page newspaper coverage and prime-time television spots across the
country; they also stimulated hundreds of alarmed editorials expressing shock at federal
practices and calling for remedial action. Senator Long helped to keep the issue bubbling
by rising on the floor of Congress and reading into the Congressional Record, as his ‘Big
Brother item for today,’ a variety of news items, editorials, and articles about electroniceavesdropping activities.”138
Despite its difficulty breaking through the bureaucracy’s obstructions, by 1965
Congress had begun to show “nervous but unmistakable signs of finally wanting to assert
its long-dormant control over the Bureau.”139 It began investigating the FBI, and
subpoenaed many FBI and government employees and officers, including J. Edgar
Hoover himself. As the Long Committee began uncovering more information, Hoover
worked harder to keep the FBI’s wiretapping, bugging, mail interception, and break-in
practices secret.140
With the help of FBI employee witnesses and whistleblowers, by 1966 the
Committee had uncovered significant evidence incriminating Hoover and the FBI.
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However, as Senator Long himself was under investigation for alleged ties to organized
crime, he agreed to keep the information under wraps. Cartha DeLoach, one of Hoover’s
minions, prepared an official release for Long stating that the FBI had not acted illegally
or without Justice Department supervision. Long did not agree to release it, however, as
he feared other members of the subcommittee would leak the wrongdoing. DeLoach
went to work on the entire subcommittee, and eventually the Long Committee threat
collapsed.141
In addition to the Senate’s Long Committee, the House of Representatives
established a Special Subcommittee on Invasion of Privacy, mainly due to Representative
Cornelius Gallagher’s (D, N.J.) request. Suggesting a vision of the future straight out of
Orwell, Gallagher warned, “It is our contention that if safeguards are not built into such a
facility, it could lead to the creation of what I call ‘The Computerized Man.’ ‘The
Computerized Man,’ as I see him, would be stripped of his individuality and privacy.’”142
Similar to the Long Committee, the House Privacy Committee held hearings and
sponsored investigations on illegal government investigatory practices. These hearings
were intended to raise public concern about possible privacy abuses resulting from
technology developments.
Like the Senate, though, the House Privacy Committee could take only small
steps to stop the FBI’s behavior. Occasionally, the Attorney General and his assistants
would ignore accusations against the FBI entirely, for fear of what would happen if they
pursued them. One scholar notes, “There was also little desire to pry into such matters, to
risk uncovering the unpleasant, or to do combat with Hoover…. In each case, there was
141
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danger in combat, so it was better not to know.”143 The latent concern with privacy,
however, grew into yet another crack in the dam that held back the influx of privacy
development in later years. It continued to grow as congress published as much as it
could.
Congress’ chipping away at the dam eventually took its toll. Despite the danger
in taking-on the FBI, nearly fifty congressional hearings and reports investigated a range
of privacy issues including federal agency practices, use of personality tests and lie
detectors, wiretapping, use of census information, and access to criminal history records.
From 1965 through 1970, over 200 bills related to privacy were introduced, with the
passage of only the Freedom of Information Act, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970.144
Following a ten-year campaign in Congress, in which the news media played a
leading role, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act, its first major piece of
privacy legislation. Under the FOIA, the public has the right to know what information
and records the government holds. It provides that “‘any person’ has a right, enforceable
in court, to access to all ‘agency records’—generally, any record in the possession of a
federal agency,”145 except in one of nine specified circumstances including national
security issues, trivial information, trade secrets, etc. This way, information once
confined strictly within government agency walls was available to the public, making it
seem as though the FOIA was actually a further infraction on individuals’ privacy rights.
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Despite its shortcomings, the FOIA was essential to information privacy reform. Once
people knew what information the government actually kept, they could work to protect
themselves.
Data collection became even more of an issue in further hearings with the Social
Science Research Council and the Budget of the Bureau. The two agencies proposed a
National Data Center to investigate major social and economic problems. This would
require storing and cataloging vast information on United States citizens.146 Alarmed by
its reach, both chambers of Congress rejected proposals for a National Data Center
twice.147 Yet, Representative Gallagher did not oppose the Data Center entirely. He
suggested that the Bureau of the Budget reform its proposal to ensure that the Center’s
data would be purely aggregate and would contain no information on individuals in hopes
that compromise would enable stronger privacy protections in the future.148
In response to the changing climate on privacy, the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) issued a statement on privacy. Less than one year after the Supreme
Court issued its legally ambiguous privacy holding in Griswold, and despite the
government’s disagreement on the fundamentality of privacy, the Commission published
that it would neither encourage nor tolerate governmental eavesdropping due to the
fundamental right of privacy.
We have decided that…we should not sanction the unannounced use of listening
or recording devices merely because one party to an otherwise private
conversation is aware that the conversation is in fact no longer private…. We
agree that the ordinary risk of being overheard is converted into another risk
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entirely when the electronic device is made the instrument of the intruder…. We
are commanded by the Communications Act to ‘encourage the larger and more
effective use of radio in the public interest.’…Upon reflection, we do not believe
it to be consistent with the public interest to permit this new product of man’s
ingenuity to destroy our traditional right to privacy.149
This implies that many different branches of the government acknowledged a
fundamental right of privacy and took steps to protect it.
The pivotal year in development of a federal wiretapping policy was 1967,
“during which the issue was the subject of the report of a presidential commission,
statements from the president, two Supreme Court decisions, and congressional
hearings.”150 Because privacy was still only an idea, (and it is difficult to legislate ideas,)
policy-makers needed to tease out the specific functional facets that would make it a
more easily regulable concept.151 For example, following the ICC’s statement and in
attempts both to appear strict on criminal issues and to protect individuals’ privacy,
Congress struggled to pass the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
Title III of the Omnibus Act prohibited private telephone eavesdropping and required a
court order for governmental eavesdropping, except in cases involving national security
or in which one party consented to the eavesdropping. Because it was the first case to
acknowledge that the fundamental right to privacy applies to a person and his
conversations, Katz v. United States was also credited as an inspiration for this
legislation.152 Interestingly, this was the first piece of political work to bridge the gap
between the Court’s dealings with privacy and the government’s activity toward it.
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The Public
During the early years of privacy regulation, a conversation emerged among
scholars, politicians and media elites. Little evidence suggests that a similar discussion
was taking place among mass publics. The nascent public awareness of privacy
infringements was insufficient to incite public action, as the public felt that some privacy
invasions were acceptable to protect it from criminals and deviants.153 In fact, despite the
extensive publicity privacy issues received, public opinion was growing at this time. In
October, 1965, after the Long Committee had begun hearings and the Court handed down
Griswold, 92% of Americans responded that they felt personally satisfied that they had a
right to privacy.154 In the same poll, Americans ranked the “right to privacy” in the top
half of the rights most important to them, though only 13% of Americans felt that the
right of privacy was the most important right,155 indicating that although people believed
they had the right, it did not inspire political action at this time. By Westin’s account, as
Congress, the president and the press continued to put privacy on the public agenda,
though, public awareness increased. “Public concern over electronic eavesdropping was
buttressed by congressional hearings and public debates over the impact on privacy of lie
detectors and personality testing, making the issue of ‘vanishing privacy’ and ‘Big
Brother’ a far more general problem than wiretapping by itself had ever become in earlier
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decades.”156 Like the slogan “guns don’t kill people, people kill people,” technology
doesn’t invade privacy; agencies using technology do. Congress, knowing this, found
agency behavior to be a functional facet of privacy which it could regulate.
By the end of Johnson’s administration, a complex relationship between public
opinion, the media, Congress and the realities of LBJ’s ties with the FBI had developed.
The FBI’s pushing too hard on the privacy issue ended up causing multiple other cracks
in the dam that had previously held back significant privacy discourse. For the public as
well as the legislature, privacy rights triggered conflicting emotions: people wanted
privacy for themselves, but not for criminals; they wanted safety but not to be listened to.
Also, the National Data Center proposal was a particular threat to the privacy of
individuals’ personal information, as it would have created nationalized databanks to
catalog information on millions of individuals held by hundreds of agencies.157 The
information held by government agencies like the FBI attracted public concern because
of the sensitivity of the information the agencies collected. Meanwhile, the literary
culture chipped away at the dam by increasing its coverage by publishing books warning
of a 1984 type world and expanding its privacy coverage to include the Court, the
president and the legislature. In response to this and questionable agency behavior,
Congress became interested in the privacy issue, as well.
Conclusion
As polls and public action toward Congress’ handling of privacy indicate, the
public became more aware of and willing to take action to protect their own privacy
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rights during the 1960s. It demanded more stringent protections of their newly acquired
and still legally tenuous fundamental right to privacy. That there is scant data flagging an
exact time public opinion reached a drastic turning point against government intrusions
on privacy, though, indicates a gradual progression toward nationwide awareness rather
than a sharp shift in public ideology. The public’s gradually increasing political activity
throughout this time, in other words, indicates a burgeoning awareness and willingness to
take action that would balloon throughout the early 1970s.
Although the Court’s early dealings with legal privacy had less effect on public
opinion than FBI behavior and government legislation, the public still looked to it as a
source for privacy protection. Westin writes, “…the eyes of the press and informed
citizens remained fixed on two basic sites [for privacy protections]—Capitol Hill and the
United States Supreme Court building.”158 This would set the stage for the next phase in
privacy development: Nixon’s administration and the Burger Court.
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Chapter 4: Nixon’s Privacy
With many small cracks beginning to form in the wall that retained a surge of
privacy awareness and activity, events under Nixon’s presidency continued to weaken it.
The spread of governmental privacy intrusions, press coverage and Congressional
investigations had expanded to the point that, by mid-1973, the public was fully aware of
and engaged in the discourse. The combination of press militancy, Congressional fervor,
ceaseless government intrusions, and a newly mobilized public at last enabled privacy to
become a statutorily recognized fundamental right, albeit nearly a decade after the Court
declared it a fundamental right. The path that privacy followed in the last stage before it
became statutorily fundamental was tumultuous.
First, the executive government continued to alienate the public, increasing its
unscrupulous privacy intrusions. Engaging newly-created governmental entities to aid
him, and dissolving those that countered him, President Nixon was unrestrained in his
ardor to gain leverage on his political opponents by wiretapping, spying, and stealing
classified information. After the highly publicized Pentagon Papers trial, in particular,
the general public became aware for the first time that the government was obsessively
spying on American citizens. The trial generated such interest that the press became
focused on exposing government misdeeds, publicizing every instance of government
spying and privacy intrusion it could document. The press drastically changed both the
content and scope of its privacy coverage. It shifted its focus from Court-related privacy
happenings to privacy activity in the executive branch, and increased its coverage of this
activity three-fold. Congress simultaneously separated itself from executive behavior,
working to expose executive actions and protect citizens from these actions. The number
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of Senate and House subcommittees dealing with privacy ballooned before 1973 to
further educate the public about government spying and exacerbate public distrust. This
resulted in a dramatic increase in public awareness of privacy issues in general, and the
privacy-movement finally gained the momentum necessary to mobilize the public. The
change in the public’s mood and underlying assumptions, if already skeptical because of
Vietnam, turned decidedly cynical in a very short period following the Pentagon Papers’
publication.159
The only player absent from the increasingly pressurized privacy dialogue was the
Supreme Court. Though it remained in its own realm handling the privacy of criminals
and deviants, and abstained from the dialogue about governmental intrusions on citizens’
privacy, it still played a key role in advancing privacy’s momentum in the 1970s. First
and more obviously, it advanced the canon of case law relevant to a litany of civil
liberties issues such as obscenity, criminal justice and social deviance. Second, the
Court’s general inaction toward privacy unless it pertained to criminals or deviants
compounded the justices’ refusal to specifically guarantee absolute privacy rights (even
from the government). This mobilized Congress and the press, which in turn further
awakened the public. As only one example of a prominent theme in academic thought,
one scholar notes that the Court still played a fundamental role in privacy’s development
over time.
Personal privacy, particularly informational privacy, emerged in the 1970s as an
issue of public policy, partly because judicial policies and constitutional
interpretation failed to promote legal recognition of and protection for
individuals’ claims that their right of privacy entails safeguards against abuse of
personal information collected, maintained, and utilized by the government.
Development of public policies relating to personal information and, more
generally, to information control within the federal government, are partially a
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response to the Court’s failure to legally recognize individuals’ privacy interests
and claims with regard to personalized information held by third parties, in both
the public and private sector.160
In other words, unrelated actions by the press, the government and the Court combined to
give privacy potency in American dialogue. This chapter explores privacy’s
developments in the seemingly disparate realms of American politics as they
compounded each other to give privacy the momentum it needed to surge into American
life.
Nixon Pre-Watergate
Before he even came to the White House, Richard Nixon engaged the issue of
privacy. On April 29, 1966, in his only Supreme Court appearance, private attorney
Richard Nixon argued for an individual’s right to privacy in Time, Inc. v. Hill. Nixon
argued that the plaintiff, who claimed that Life magazine falsely reported about a new
play portraying a traumatic event for the plaintiff and his family, was protected from the
media’s intrusion on his right to personal privacy. He chose to represent the Hill family
based on his own personal conviction that Justice Brandeis was correct—that there was a
“right to be let alone.”161 To Nixon’s dismay, the Court held that because Hill’s
experience was public knowledge, he was not entitled to privacy protections, and Nixon
lost the case. In 1966, it was not an unusual opinion, but Nixon did not take the decision
lightly. Nixon blamed himself for the loss, thinking he could have presented better
arguments. “In a lengthy memorandum written the next day…, Mr. Nixon critiqued his
own effort, exploring in detail what other points he might have raised using the Ninth and
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Tenth Amendments ‘to give redress to private citizens where they are injured by other
private citizens.’”162 Before he ran for the presidency, Nixon clearly felt a strong affinity
for citizens’ privacy from other citizens, which foreshadowed his public action to protect
the right. However, this ambiguous concept conflicted with his desire for law and order,
and political advantages. Once he took office, he had the opportunity to reconcile these
differences.
Over these years, Nixon learned a great deal from the way Johnson treated
personal privacy. Amongst other things, he adopted Johnson’s use of the FBI and other
investigatory agencies to further his political ends while publicly behaving like a crusader
for personal privacy protection. To the public, still recoiling from Johnson and the FBI,
Nixon was a champion of personal privacy protection. Much of his behavior was
comforting to the public, despite that he had taken few actions to evidence his claim.
Like Johnson, Nixon spoke publicly in favor of personal privacy but acted to restrict
privacy rights by implementing his own eavesdropping and wiretapping policies. He
also self-consciously chose justices whom he believed would restrict criminal rights and
civil liberties in an effort to maintain a law-and-order ethos.163
During this time, Nixon continued to spy, illegally under Katz (1967),164 on
political opponents, social deviants, criminals, and anyone else he felt could be a threat to
his country or his career. Like Johnson, Nixon was a clever political craftsman. During a
time of heightened public fear of attacks wrought by the Cold War and communist
infiltration, the administration pushed a national security agenda to ease the concern.
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Using the public’s desire for protection to his advantage, Nixon committed many privacy
invasions under the guise of national security protection. Between 1969 and 1971, Nixon
had placed wiretaps on 13 government officials and four newsmen who he felt might be
leaking highly classified national security information regarding the Vietnam War. In
actuality, the wiretaps were used to gather dirt on his political opponents, as evidenced by
Nixon’s refusal to remove the taps after the officials left their government positions.165
Unsatisfied by the scope of the information he collected, Nixon ordered the
creation and implementation of a Domestic Intelligence Plan in 1970. Though this
operation was to be entirely confidential, he still had to give the impression to those
involved that he was working for national security. Nixon planned to commit acts and
use methods that, as he tried to deny were illegal or unconstitutional, to gather
information on American citizens to further his political ends. He involved directors of
the FBI, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency, asking for
suggestions and options for methods of spying and information gathering. Nixon
authorized breaking and entering, opening of personal mail, and electronic
eavesdropping. His targets included anti-war demonstrators, black extremists, and
demonstrators in general.166 Again, to those involved, Nixon claimed both executive
authority to protect national security and behavior of previous presidents to justify this
behavior. That is, because he faced some internal opposition, Nixon still had to defend
what he was doing whether or not it was public. J. Edgar Hoover and Attorney General
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John Mitchell adamantly voiced their objections to the Plan, and Nixon rescinded his
orders five days later.167
Rather than scrapping the entire idea, Nixon replaced it in late 1970 or early 1971
with the newly-created Interagency Evaluation Committee. Before this agency began to
function, Nixon became interested in I.R.S. collections of “valuable intelligence-type
information…as a result of their field audits. 168 Still dissatisfied with the lack of
information collected, Nixon set up his own specialized investigation unit known as the
“Plumbers.”169 Between June and August of the following year, the White House used
information gathered by the Plumbers to develop a list of its political opponents and
“enemies.” According to White House Counsel John Dean’s testimony to the Ervin
Committee, the White house “maintained…an enemies list, which was rather extensive
and continually being updated.”170 The White House would send lists of these names to
the IRS and have them investigated.
The depth of Nixon’s invasions of legality and trust are well-known but
fundamental to the watershed moment for privacy. Indeed, Nixon relentlessly and
illegally worked to ensure his reelection in 1972. The Committee to Re-Elect the
President (CREEP), “went beyond political ‘tricks’ to sabotage the Democratic
candidates. It undertook a wiretapping and break-in program to spy on the opposition,
without precedent in American campaigns, and which subsequently set off a national
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scandal.”171 As the 1972 election approached, Nixon’s administration launched yet
another massive campaign against antiwar leaders and Democratic officials. “The White
House embarked upon a calculated, systematic assault on the integrity of the American
electoral process for the purpose of assuring Richard Nixon’s reelection in 1972.”172
Working with top-agents G. Gordon Liddy, E. Howard Hunt, and James McCord, all
under Nixon’s awareness,173 five CREEP agents were arrested for breaking into the
Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate hotel in Washington,
D.C. Days later, seven more were arrested and jailed. Immediately after the CREEP
agents were arrested, Nixon’s administration began a massive cover-up. Nixon officials
destroyed evidence, offered false testimony, paid over $450,000 to keep burglars and
conspirators silent, and blackmailed FBI and CIA agents.174 All the while, President
Nixon tape-recorded all the conversations that took place in the Oval Office; he was
successful in covering-up the scandal for over a year. To further encourage Nixon, his
“systematic assault” appeared vindicated when he was reelected by a 520-18 electoral
margin.
Nixon actually hit his first major stumbling ground with the publication of the
Pentagon Papers and the resulting highly publicized 1973 trial. The Pentagon Papers
were a compilation of US government documents detailing the United States’ political
and military involvement, and pending failure in Vietnam. They reflected quite poorly
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upon Nixon and his predecessors.175 They show utter disregard for the loss of human
life, both American and Vietnamese, and deep cynicism toward the public. They express
the administration’s awareness that the United States had very little chance of winning
the war, and were intended to be strictly confidential within the State Department.176
When one scrupulous government official, Daniel Ellsberg, felt the documents needed to
come forward, he illegally submitted them to the New York Times for publication.177
Within twelve days, Nixon had suspended publication of the documents, claiming that
they were private classified government information and that their release would pose a
national security threat. It is likely that Nixon did not want the papers released because
of the negative political impact they would have had, but once again claimed national
security interest. In fact, current scholarship indicates that Nixon only opposed the
publication because he feared a trend in the press that would eventually expose his own
personal misbehaviors.178 Still, the New York Times’ decision to continue printing these
government assessments of the war, despite Nixon’s opposition, was challenged by the
White House. The Supreme Court ordered that the First Amendment allowed the New
York Times to continue printing.
The White House responded again with legal retaliation. The Justice Department
indicted Ellsberg and his collaborator, Anthony Russo, for theft and espionage.179 In
Ellsberg’s highly-publicized trial, Nixon and his right-hand man, John Ehrlichman, sent
the Plumbers to break-in to Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office and illegally obtain
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information. This break-in proved crucial to the case when presiding Judge Byrne
declared a mistrial, asserting that the evidence was illegitimate. Byrne stated that he
likely would have accepted the information had it been legally obtained, and reprimanded
the administration for dishonest evidence-gathering. Meanwhile, the press continued to
increase its coverage of the White House, publicizing as much information about the
scandal as it could.180 This helped bring Nixon’s illegal privacy-practices to the public
eye.181 As a result, Nixon came to consider the press his enemy.182 Still, because
publications exposing dirt on the administration generated such public interest, the press
became increasingly aggressive in its coverage of government misdeeds. This had two
key effects. First, it began to raise citizen distrust of the government. Second, it set the
press on its path to persistently follow Watergate developments as they occurred based on
the public’s newly solidified right to know.183 By the time Watergate details started to
pour from the press, the increasingly distrustful public was particularly apt to absorb
them. One scholar notes that The Pentagon Papers ordeal laid the foundation for
Watergate. The Pentagon Papers “ushered in a new era of press militancy in which
journalists would see their primary function as exposing government sins rather than
simply reporting what government said and did. Indeed, it is possible that without The
Pentagon Papers exposure of Watergate would not have occurred.”184 Thus, the
resulting incident added yet another significant crack to the dam that held back privacy.
Unbeknownst to anyone involved, it had but two years before it would breach entirely.
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The Media
Fueled by the Pentagon Papers scandal, the press publicized the administration’s
privacy violations with increasing fervor. But even before the scandal arose, the press
had increased its coverage of privacy-related events. Interestingly, Life magazine and the
Washington Post were involved with illegal wiretapping. Investigative reporters used
private taps to further their own ends, though they still published stories on the
government’s eavesdropping and illicit use of wiretaps.185 Results from the New York
Times study discussed in Chapter 3 tell a great deal about privacy post-1970. While the
content of the articles increased gradually in depth and substance between 1965 and
1970, frequency, length, and focus of coverage exploded in 1970, as seen in Graph 3.1.
Of the 47 total front page references to privacy, 41 (93.6 percent) of them occurred in
1970 or later. The articles became focused on privacy or the “right to privacy,” rather
than merely mentioning it. As indicated in the graph below, the number of citations or
abstracts containing the word “privacy” nearly doubled between 1965 and 1975.
Similarly, the number of articles with the phrase “right to privacy” or “right of privacy”
in the abstract or citation more than tripled between 1965 and 1975, but increased by
more than 3.5 times between 1970 and 1975.
Privacy coverage reached an all time high immediately following Stanley, but
dipped into the lowest it had been since 1966. Coverage rebounded in 1971 when the
Court issued four privacy-centered holdings. The number of privacy-related articles rose
again most dramatically between 1971 and 1973, during the Pentagon Papers scandal. In
fact, 63 percent of front page articles occurred in or after 1972. At the end of the scandal,
the militant press also published Watergate-related information as soon as it could. With
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such information coming to the limelight, the public was primed to receive the Roe
opinion when the Court handed it down in 1973.
Post-1970 press attention increased social and political awareness of reproductive
and marital privacy, particularly in the months leading up to and immediately following
Roe. As limitations on abortion were much more easily enforced than those regulating
sexual conduct behind closed doors, it seems logical to assume that people felt their
sexual privacy rights were in jeopardy. In addition to piquing public interest on
reproductive privacy, post-1970 press attention began to increase political awareness and
public attention about information and technology privacy, likely because the common
citizen had few other outlets to learn about these issues. Whereas the elite and the
government were engaged in a privacy dialog before 1970, general public awareness and
activity likely increased along with press attention.

Table 4.1—New York Times Privacy Coverage per Quarter: 1970-1974

Quarter
Jan-Mar 1970
Apr-Jun 1970
Jul-Sep 1970
Oct-Dec 1970
Jan-Mar 1971
Apr-Jun 1971
Jul-Sep 1971
Oct-Dec 1971
Jan-Mar 1972
Apr-Jun 1972
Jul-Sep 1972
Oct-Dec 1972
Jan-Mar 1973
Apr-Jun 1973
Jul-Sep 1973

Number of Articles with
“Right to Privacy” or
“Right of Privacy” in text
25
12
18
20
35
39
12
39
47
27
44
49
38
28
25

80

Number of Articles with
“Right to Privacy” or
“Right of Privacy” in
Citation or Abstract
0
0
1
0
1
3
0
0
2
1
3
0
5
1
0

Number of Articles with
"Privacy" in abstract or
citation
7
11
6
6
17
9
5
16
15
7
18
11
24
16
22

Oct-Dec 1973
Jan-Mar 1974
Apr-Jun 1974
Jul-Sep 1974
Oct-Dec 1974

14
44
46
36
39

1
6
8
3
4

Congress and the Public
Congressmen and their staffs also played a vital role in the dissemination of truths
about privacy, developing an increasing interest in regulating governmental privacy
intrusions. Leadership in these movements came from chairs of myriad congressional
committees and subcommittees. In the Senate, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D.—NC) led
the brigade because of the thousands of complaints that he, as committee chair, received
on a range of issues, “including polygraphs, background checks, and census
questions.”186 In 1970, he initiated a four-year study on government information banks
of private personal information.187 Senator Ervin also chaired the most prominent and
persistent privacy committee, known as the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights.
Ervin dedicated the committee’s work to provide “the first public forums for an incipient
privacy community” in 1971. He responded both to concerned citizens and because he
recognized the need for a legislative body to take charge of the issue and make the public
aware of government activities.
In building congressional support for legislation, Senator Ervin acknowledged the
importance of providing detailed information on agency practices and their effects
on individuals. The thousands of complaints that the subcommittee received
increased Senator Ervin’s commitment to the issue. He also routed the
complaints of citizens to the senators who represented them, which worked to
broaden the Senate’s interest in and concern about the federal government’s
information practices.188
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15
18
32
15
17

The Ervin Committee study found more than 858 data banks in 54 agencies containing
more than 1.25 billion files on individuals.189 Ervin’s committee made these findings
public, which assuredly provoked informed citizens. As indicative of the new mood
developing on Capitol Hill, Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1971 which
established that an individual should be informed of the “nature and substance” of
information held about him and could amend the information to ensure its accuracy.190
This public activity grew from a latent to a real interest in privacy, where the now
informed public was no longer willing to passively stand by.191 Growing elite public
interest and key behind-the-scenes participants in formation of these subcommittees aided
the trickle-down to the general public. People like Alan Westin, director of Washington,
D.C.’s branch of the ACLU Privacy Committee, Hope Eastman, Arthur Miller, and
Ervin’s Subcommittee staff were all critical in making the elite discourse general public
knowledge.192 As the discourse filtered from the elites to the common citizen, a policy
community of citizens and legislators began to form, calling for (but not yet demanding)
specific regulations.193
When they began to arise in the 1960s, privacy policy issues did not fit easily into
the existing policy subsystem. Within a policy subsystem, one scholar agues, is an
established community of specialists, “researchers, congressional staff, interest-group
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advocates, academics, and government analysts.”194 But because privacy was such a fresh
issue in American discourse, it was too new to have an established subsystem and was
too amorphous to warrant enforceable, overarching regulations. Therefore, new systems
had to be developed. Two types of policy systems emerged from this gap in privacy
support. One core policy community began with interest in “general privacy issues” and
existed alongside other “specialized privacy communities, or advocacy coalitions,” which
were concerned with specific aspects of privacy. The two types of communities worked
with legislators by formulating position papers and policy alternatives, discussing ideas,
holding meetings to develop consensuses, and drafting legislative proposals to create
enforceable privacy regulations.195 Also because the privacy issue was so new, many
individuals with diverse perspectives and ideas came together to put further pressure on
Congress to regulate privacy.196 This activity portended the flood.
The Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the FBI, the most prominent leftist
activist group, took a stand against FBI wiretapping. In 1971, several members broke
into a Pennsylvania FBI office and absconded with over 1000 classified documents
detailing the FBI’s involvement in the Cointelpro operation. They mailed the documents
anonymously to several major American newspapers. While many newspapers declined
to publish the Commission’s findings, WIN Magazine, a journal associated with the War
Resisters League published the documents in their entirety in 1972. The press and public
were outraged, and demanded a change.197
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Also in 1972, two important studies were published for citizen consumption.
First, Alan Westin and Michael Baker wrote Data Banks in a Free Society, pointing out
the computer’s new capabilities and calling for new legislative, administrative and
judicial measures to “define and assure rights of privacy and due process.”198 The study
highlighted profiles of governmental, commercial and private organizations that keep
information records on citizens. It also discussed public policies necessary to keep up
with burgeoning technology and amplified suspicion and curiosity.199 The second study,
Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, sponsored by the US Department of
Health, Education and Welfare and conducted by the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on
Automated Personal Data Systems, recommended that record-keeping organizations,
particularly governmental ones, adhere to five fundamental principles of “fair
information practices” as outlined in the FOIA. This statement of principles gives us a
measure of the thinking at the time. The principles were first that there must be no
personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret; second that there
must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him is in a record and
how it is used; third that there must be a way for an individual to prevent information
about him that was obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other
purposes without his consent; fourth that there must be a way for an individual to correct
or amend a record of identifiable information about him; and fifth that any organization
creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of identifiable personal data must
assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take precautions to
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prevent misuse of the data.200 In short, these principles emphasized a particular “right to
know” relationship between the citizen and the government. Essentially, trends
demonstrated Congressional insistence that the public had both a right to know what the
information the government kept and a right to ensure its accuracy. Congress took these
regulations very seriously, as they would appear in several pieces of later legislation.
In response to this legislative and public pressure, the FBI ceased its Cointelpro
operation, and the Federal Establishment of Wiretapping Jurisdiction—the single most
significant privacy invader—cut its wiretap usage by 25% (from 281 wiretaps in 1971 to
210 in 1972,) and again by 35% (from 210 wiretaps in 1970 to 130 wiretaps) between
1972 and 1973. Combined, from 1971-1973, the central federal wiretapping agency cut
its wiretap usage by over 50%.201
Conclusion
This rapid, substantial decrease in federal privacy intrusion was no small affair.
Not only did it exemplify a marked increase in federal valuation of citizens’ privacy, but
it indicated the effectiveness of Congress and the press to produce results. Whether the
push came from the legislature or the press and eventually the public, things began to
change. Pressure came from Congress, which relentlessly investigated federal
government privacy infringements. By forming numerous committees and holding
hundreds of hearings to find out the truth, it began taking the necessary steps to solve the
privacy problem. Likewise, the press took great interest in publicizing as much
200
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governmental privacy activity as it could find, relating to the federal privacy invaders,
Congress and the Court. Gradually, the information from Congress and the press began
to filter down to the American public, still remaining largely in an elite discourse but
slowly gaining salience in the general public. By 1973, the combination of
Congressional pressure and increasing public awareness left privacy with little chance of
remaining in the deeper areas of the American mentality. It would soon come to the
forefront of American legal, social and political thought, demanding regulation and
protection.
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Chapter 5: The Flood of 1973
With pressure mounting from multiple directions, the government, and the media
all made American society more attuned to privacy and contributed to growing public
sensitivity toward the new public issue. In 1973, two seemingly unrelated events
provided the pressure that enabled an all-inclusive privacy discourse. Not only did both
of these events involve privacy, but they incorporated numerous other issues that gained
them national salience. They each included discussions of federalism and deviance,
which brought additional attention to their inherent privacy debates. First, the Court
handed down its opinion for Roe v. Wade (1973), which returned privacy to the forefront
of legal thought, this time with significant press and public attention. It made a clear
statement about reproductive privacy and the fundamentality of the privacy right. This
time, it was not criminals’ and deviants’ privacy that was under siege; the privacy of
everyday women was also in jeopardy of being officially denied by the federal
government. Wherever it could be found in the Constitution, the Court argued, privacy
encompassed the right to an abortion.
Second, the Watergate scandal enabled rapid dissemination of news about
information privacy invasions. While governmental privacy intrusion was easily
overlooked by the average non-newspaper reading citizen, the Watergate scandal brought
awareness of government misdeeds to nearly everyone. Though Watergate did not
violate the average citizen’s privacy, it prompted a public loss of trust that even the White
House was no longer capable of discretionary power. 202 Once the public has lost trust in
the administration, it was primed to absorb news of governmental privacy invasions.
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Any average American could have been under the executive looking glass, and because
of Watergate, every average American was aware of that fact. The White House’s
misdeeds made the public vulnerable so that when Congress disseminated its committee
findings and the press publicized what the government was doing, people were finally
ready to believe it.
It is no surprise that the separate interpretations of privacy, one regarding
sexuality and the other regarding information, affected different behaviors in the Court
and Congress. Interestingly, though, the two also complemented one another. Where
Congress lacked in its coverage of reproductive privacy, the Court took over. And where
the Court neglected to deal with information and technology privacy, Congress excelled.
Whichever direction an inquiring citizen looked, whether toward the Court or toward the
legislature, privacy was there; it was virtually unavoidable. Because of multiple-fold
activity from two different branches of government about two dissimilar areas of privacy,
which gave privacy extreme vitality in many areas of society, Congress was highly
pressured to actually protect privacy. At last, privacy could be broken down into its
component parts—reproductive, criminal, and informational—to the point that each part
could be regulated. As a result of its Watergate and Roe v. Wade, the privacy dam, which
resulted from confused inaction toward the right, crumbled. Between 1973 and mid1974, Congress proposed (but did not pass) hundreds of pieces of privacy legislation, the
press tripled its coverage of a range of privacy issues, the public engaged in the civic
discourse.203 The President echoed this activity in his speeches and calls for legislation.
In an effort to pass a comprehensive and satisfying piece of legislation in the term
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following Roe and Watergate, Congress hastily passed the Federal Privacy Act on
December 31, 1974.
Table 5.1—Timeline of Relevant Events
October 11, 1972
January 22, 1973
January 30, 1973
April-October,
1973
May 11, 1973
June 3, 1973
July, 1973
July 23, 1973
January 30, 1974
February 2-3, 1974
March, 1974
July 9, 1974
August, 1974
November 21, 1974
Dec 11-22, 1974
December 31, 1974

Roe v. Wade oral arguments
Roe v. Wade decided
Former Nixon aides G. Gordon Liddy and James McCord Jr.
convicted of conspiracy, burglary and wiretapping in Watergate
incident
Nixon's top White House staffers, H.R. Haldeman and John
Ehrlichman, and Attorney General Richard Kleindienst resign over
Watergate, others are fired
Ellsberg trial dismissed
Nixon officials tell Watergate investigators that he discussed the
Watergate cover-up with President Nixon at least 35 times
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare publishes
Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens
Nixon subpoenaed to relinquish Oval Office tapes
Nixon gives editorializing State of the Union address urging
privacy protections
Ervin and Department of Justice introduce two proposals to protect
privacy
National Bureau of Standards holds privacy conference
Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren conference held on privacy
Nixon resigns
House and Senate override President Ford’s veto and pass the
FOIA amendments
Senate and House pass versions of the Privacy Act
Finalized Privacy Act passes

Roe v. Wade
When the Court handed down its opinion for Roe v. Wade in January of 1973, it
was an outlier for three reasons. First, it was riddled with highly controversial and
divisive content. Also, it threatened to close the door, federally, on privacy of not
criminals and deviants, but of everyday wives and daughters. For those who were willing
to ignore the Court’s previous privacy decisions because they had no commonplace
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applicability, privacy finally began to have bite. Unconcerned that the Court was not
willing to frame the rights of a sexual deviant or a murderer, as privacy issues applied to
all women, the public suddenly took interest. Last, though the Court previously hinted at
a birth of a comprehensive concept of privacy, it was at last willing to extend the right in
Roe. Not only did it acknowledge the right, but it neglected to grapple with the right’s
origin and scope. Because Roe was an anomaly, its deviation from Court norms
compiled with its inflammatory content generated heavy publicity. It left political and
academic elites with a feeling of incompleteness.204 After the Court acknowledged that
the ethereal privacy right subsumed the right to an abortion, which was a narrowlytailored and quite specific statement, it could have brought to light the myriad vacancies
in privacy recognition. Put differently, though the Court acknowledged that privacy itself
could be broad, it only applied it to one specific issue. This narrow view could have
brought attention to a vacancy in the privacy right that was still unprotected.
Because it was an unclearly established point, Roe was highly divisive and
unsatisfying to both sides. One scholar notes that Americans “on both sides of the issue
were astonished by the decision,”205 in the sense that neither side found the legal
precedent it sought in Roe. Roe encouraged everyone, pro or anti-legalization, to have an
opinion, those opposed to abortion rejected the notion that the opinion was just or fair,
and those that supported abortion worried that the decision was legally unsound. One
scholar notes that the heart of Roe’s resulting public debate revolved around the fact that
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the abortion right was grounded in the larger “more encompassing privacy rights.” 206
Though anti-abortionists would have embraced privacy if it helped to protect a right to
school prayer, for example, they charged that the Court had “overstepped its bounds” and
created a new right that did not exist anywhere in the Constitution. “Nowhere in the
Constitution, they insisted, was there anything—neither a word nor a phrase—to suggest
a right of privacy and by association the right to abortion….”207 Interestingly, as the prolife contingent came to realize that it also supported the privacy right as applied to school
prayer and information privacy, it also rescinded its argument that privacy did not exist.
Instead, they reluctantly accepted the privacy argument, stating that it still did not
encompass the right to an abortion. One scholar notes that the Roe debates veered away
from the privacy realm and became purely about abortion. “As for justification of the
privacy right, advocates claimed that privacy, like liberty, ran throughout the Constitution
rather than being located in any one place within it… Beaten back by the fact that most
Americans wanted to believe in a right to privacy, antiabortionists argued that abortion
was still not about privacy.”208
Despite that it had been clouded by debate about the rights of the fetus, the main
issue remained one of a woman’s right to privacy. The president of the Planned
Parenthood Federation of America, Dr. Alan Guttmacher, who framed the debate with
privacy as its foundation, hailed the ruling as “a wise and courageous stroke for the right
of privacy….”209 Those who had lost sight of the key issue and looked at Roe as an
abortion case rather than a privacy case were quickly reminded that Roe was indeed a
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case securing the right to privacy in Constitutional thought. Roe had made its mark.
“Allegiance to the privacy precedent established in Griswold and solidified in Roe
became ‘a litmus test for membership in the ‘mainstream of constitutional thought.’”210
It had been “enshrine[d]…as a ‘fixed star in our constitutional firmament.’”211 Once the
Court audaciously declared privacy a fundamental right, the least dangerous branch
perhaps unknowingly opened the doors for Roe v. Wade, which would become one of the
twentieth century’s most socially and politically divisive and mobilizing cases. Due to its
highly controversial nature, coverage of several legal issues, and deviation from Court
trends, it gained remarkable publicity for the privacy discussion. This publicity helped
push privacy into the mainstream of American discourse.
Watergate Breaks and the Water Gate Breaks
Meanwhile, in the White House, Nixon was reveling in his 1972 election victory
and the apparent success of the Watergate cover-up. As a trend that would eventually
lead to his political demise, though, “leaks…became the order of the day.”212 These
leaks became so severe that the privacy dam had little chance of survival. The wellknown tale glorifies the Washington Post’s Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein for
publishing information about Watergate from a White House official who called himself
Deep Throat. Not only did they publicize, but they played a key role in initiating
Watergate coverage in other areas.213 They regularly published news of the Watergate
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cover-up, and influenced other press members to do the same. Such adamant press
coverage further contributed to the changing public mood toward the administration.
Beginning with the Pentagon Papers scandal and continuing through Watergate, the
public’s trust in the government greatly declined,214 making it more susceptible to further
coverage of privacy intrusions.
In June 1973, CREEP officials L. Patrick Gray and James McCord testified before
the Senate Judiciary Committee tying high-ranking White House officials to the
Watergate break-in. Their testimonies blew the cover on the Watergate cover-up.
Leading newspapers finally caught up with Woodward and Bernstein, printing daily
articles tying increasingly high-ranking White House officials to the scandal. Later that
year, three of Nixon’s closest officials resigned, and John Dean made public the
president’s involvement in Watergate. Within months, a grand jury subpoenaed Nixon to
relinquish the tapes taken of his Oval Office conversations.215 This was the beginning of
the end for President Nixon but was just the beginning for privacy’s life in the United
States.
The instant that speculation of a Watergate scandal came to the public eye,
President Nixon changed his public stance on privacy. While he previously opposed
citizens intruding on other citizens’ privacy, it was not until he was in danger of being
exposed that he took any serious action to legally protect individuals’ rights to privacy
from government intrusions. In his 1974 State of the Union address, Nixon championed
privacy.
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One measure of a truly free society is the vigor with which it protects the liberties
of its individual citizens. As technology has advanced in America, it has
increasingly encroached on one of those liberties--what I term the right of
personal privacy. Modern information systems, data banks, credit records, mailing
list abuses, electronic snooping, the collection of personal data for one purpose
that may be used for another--all these have left millions of Americans deeply
concerned by the privacy they cherish.
And the time has come, therefore, for a major initiative to define the
nature and extent of the basic rights of privacy and to erect new safeguards to
ensure that those rights are respected.
I shall launch such an effort this year at the highest levels of the
Administration, and I look forward again to working with this Congress in
establishing a new set of standards that respect the legitimate needs of society, but
that also recognize personal privacy as a cardinal principle of American liberty.216
Though he found the idea ideologically compelling, perhaps Nixon had such a
difficult time respecting privacy in practice because he sought to gain quite a lot from
spying. Most likely, Nixon wanted to support the right against privacy intrusions from
everyone but himself. He called for legislation and publicly condemned governmental
snooping but continued to snoop himself. Though it would be difficult to isolate what
caused the shift in his stance, there are two possible motivating factors. First, it is
possible that he translated his desire to protect himself from further governmental
intrusions into his private behavior into a desire to protect all citizens from governmental
intrusions. Or, perhaps Nixon shifted his opinion in a last-ditch effort to regain the
public’s trust and affection. Regardless of why Nixon changed his stance, as speculation
turned into fact, the righteous Senator Ervin started a committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities, also known as the Watergate Committee, to investigate and
publicize Nixon’s indiscretions. Also by the time of Watergate, the pressures on the FBI
would be too significant for it to avoid a full disclosure about its illegal activities with the
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President to Congress. The Second Article of Impeachment, “Improper Use of
Intelligence Agencies,” made available every unseemly detail about Nixon’s romp with
the FBI that the public did not already know. 217 Still, it would take Congress and the
courts the next year to organize their approach to the Watergate issue. Nixon continued
the presidency as normal, with privacy as a new cause. Still, the momentum from more
than a decade of build-up pushed privacy to a point of no return.
The Flood
Privacy flooded the press in January 1974, perhaps in response to President
Nixon’s incendiary State of the Union address drawing attention to the need for more
privacy protections and the Watergate scandal.218 Prior to the 1974 peak, it appears that
spikes in New York Times coverage of privacy issues are largely Court related; they
covered Court cases and subjects as they became relevant. Interestingly, between 1972
and 1975, only 9 of the 34 articles with “privacy” in the citation or abstract mentioned
Watergate somewhere in the document text. In other words, only about ¼ of the articles
the New York Times wrote about privacy were explicitly connected to Watergate. This
low number of articles linking Watergate and privacy indicates that press interest in
privacy developed independently from but simultaneously with the Watergate.

But the

spike in privacy-related articles during this time indicates an overall growing interest in
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the issue. This further supports that Watergate fueled interest in privacy but did not
become tangled in the privacy discourse. By 1973, privacy had a “life of its own.”219
A flood of congressional interest in the privacy issue also surged after the FBI
came forward and Watergate became household information. Committees that had no
prior interest in privacy dedicated at least some of their work to investigating and
attempting to regulate privacy. Some of these committees included the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy, Senate Appropriations Committee, Senate Armed Services
Committee, Preparedness Subcommittee to the Armed Services Committee, Senate
Judiciary Committee, House Judiciary Committee, Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Labor Management Relations of the Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Senate
Subcommittee on Internal Security. All the different committees interested in privacy
were having difficulty coordinating schedules for hearings and meetings. Rather than
consolidating their efforts, then, they published many different reports with similar
findings. This explosion of published revelations disturbed the public and mobilized a
broader range of supporters. Ervin’s committee and Gallagher’s committee actually
“competed for ownership of the privacy issue,” which further publicized congressional
interest.220 Hearings also made public the human-interest stories and anecdotal accounts
of privacy invasions, which made them newsworthy. The publicized human element
made issues more real to the public. They also inclined the public to take the side of the
individual over the societal benefits of information gathering. The Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare published Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, a key
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study on privacy and technology. It held that even though technology had exploded
during the 1970s, it was not the culprit; it merely gave agencies a more convenient
method to catalog information on citizens.221 This suggestion likely converted anyone
who still blamed privacy intrusions on technology to the alternative frame that the people
in power were abusing the technological advancements. By this time, the public was
fully mobilized to participate in the democratic process by writing congressmen and
participating in the civic discourse.222
Proposals for privacy protections emerged from all imaginable corners of
Congress. In fact, the Ninthird Congress came to be called the ‘Privacy Congress,’
principally because of the vast number of bills introduced between 1973 and 1974.
Congress discussed approximately 250 bills relating to the Omnibus and the Fair Credit
Reporting Acts, criminal justice information, bank records, and wiretapping.223 The
Privacy Congress enacted two major privacy statutes— the Family Educational Rights
(the Buckley Amendments) and Privacy Act of 1974. At its most basic level, nearly all
proposed legislation called for citizens to know when and if information was held on
them. Nearly as many would have required that citizens could access the information
held about them and check it for accuracy. From there, some bills called for federal
oversight, others called for state agency protection, and others still would have formed
personal citizens’ committees to monitor information practices. Congressional studies
found that the variance between various privacy policies were frequently crosscutting or
221

Ware, W. H. (1973). Data banks, privacy, and society. Santa Monica, Calif: Rand Corp.
Regan, P. M. (1995). Legislating privacy : technology, social values, and public policy. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 207.
223
Larsen, K. S., Domestic Council (U.S.) Committee on the Right of Privacy, Council of State
Governments, & Seminar on Privacy, Washington, D.C. (1976). Privacy, a public concern : a resource
document based on the proceedings of a Seminar on Privacy sponsored by the Domestic Council
Committee on the Right of Privacy and the Council of State Governments. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 80.
222

97

contradictory, rendering them ineffective. These conflicts necessitated the attempt at a
nationalized privacy policy.224
Realizing this, Nixon worked even harder for such a policy. In his 1974 State of
the Union address, Nixon called for a “major initiative” to safeguard individuals’ “rights
of privacy.” Less than two days later, the Justice Department jumped forward with a
proposal for a feasible bill. Senator Ervin came forward with an even more restrictive
bill. The Department of Justice bill would have required that citizens could review the
information held about them, check it for accuracy, and sue anyone who improperly
disclosed it. The proposal would also have required that personal records be sealed after
a certain time period. Ervin’s bill went one step further. He proposed to place the entire
criminal justice data system under the supervision of a nine-man board. While neither
bill passed in its entirety, each had bi-partisan sponsorship and contained principles the
majority of congressmen could support.225
By early-1974, privacy had both exploded in American discourse and become a
bi-partisan concern. At the National Bureau Standards Conference in March of 1974,
Congressmen gathered to discuss a national privacy policy. As the participants noted, the
purpose of the conference was to enact action-oriented programs which would ease “the
problems of data confidentiality and computer security.”226 Congressman Edward I.
Koch (D-NY) said, “If there is any legislation that I believe requires the support of
everyone…it’s legislation to ensure the right of privacy.” Congressman Barry M.
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Goldwater, Jr. (R-CA) also urged congressional action toward a nationalized privacy
statute. After the conference, Congressmen Koch and Goldwater co-sponsored a new
bill, HR 14163, to define information practices to protect personal data files held by both
the government and the private sector. 227
Later on June 7-8, 1974, at the Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on
Advocacy in the United States, scholars, former law enforcement officers and
organization leaders of all political persuasions gathered to discuss protection from
governmental intrusions on personal privacy. Just two months after the National Bureau
of Standards Conference, privacy conferences had become commonplace. At this
gathering, the conferees concurred that the most basic “informational” privacy a person
can have is control over the “collection and use of personal information about
themselves.”228 They agreed that no type of governmental electronic eavesdropping or
information gathering should be allowed without a warrant. “A substantial majority
recommended that no surveillance for intelligence purposes be permitted.”229 The
conference almost unanimously agreed on two recommendations to the government,
asserting that it should not be allowed to continue its current practices.
[First,] every government agency should be barred from collecting any data
concerning political activity, association, or expression—protected under the First
Amendment—and should destroy any such data now in existence in both
legislative and executive agencies. [Second] there should be no use and
placement of a human agent for surreptitious surveillance, except upon court
order based on probable cause and subject to the same restraints and restrictions
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as the use and employment of the surreptitious electronic eavesdropping devices
and techniques now provided for by the Omnibus Crime Bill.230
Clearly these concerns arose out of fears that the government would continue to intrude
in the way it had over the last fifteen years. Interestingly, many conferees did not wish to
extend stringent privacy protections to criminals, 231 implying that only people not
deserving of the fundamental right to privacy were criminals and deviants. As they made
no mention of law-abiding women or intimate privacy, for example, we are to assume
that the conference favored privacy protections for everyone else. As a result, by late
1974, the government used wiretaps to eavesdrop on little more than gamblers and
criminals. This drop in government snooping was not enough to keep Richard Nixon
from resigning the presidency in August of 1974. Though a less aggressive Gerald Ford
took Nixon’s place, the privacy issue had gained such force in society that nothing could
stop the insurgence of privacy activity.
The Court’s responsibilities for issuing the warrants and hearing the claims of
invasion of privacy and illegal surveillance gave it a key role in these discussions. This
conference stated that the government was to assume there was enough evidence to
convict a person before installing the tap. The courts were therefore hesitant to convict
people charged using illegally-obtained evidence. Less than 1/3 of illegal taps resulted in
a conviction, even though they supplied incriminating evidence, which indicates that
courts were acquitting people that would likely have been found guilty without illegally-
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obtained tap evidence.232 Even so, the Court remained focused largely on
reproductive/marital privacy and citizens’ privacy protections from other citizens.
In response to mounting pressure from all areas of society, Congress took two
steps to protect individuals’ rights to privacy from the government. First, it updated the
FOIA, overriding President Ford’s veto, and second, it proposed the Federal Privacy Act
of 1974. The 1974 version of the FOIA and the Privacy Act demonstrated a
congressional attempt to balance an individual’s right of privacy with the preservation of
the public’s right to Government information.233
In an effort to pack privacy legislation into 1974, on December 31, Congress
passed the Privacy Act of 1974. Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens and the
FOIA’s “five points” provided the initial framework for the Privacy Act. After extensive
hearings in both chambers, both the Senate and the House passed the bill. Because
Congress passed the Privacy Act in such haste, it was highly problematic. First, the
House of Representatives and the Senate passed two different versions of the bill, whose
differences included the creation of a Privacy Protection Study Commission, rule-making
processes, damage recovery policy, standards for data collection, and provisions for
mediating conflicts between the FOIA and the Privacy Act. 234 Members of the House
and the Senate compromised, and legislation was signed into action on December 31,
1974. Interestingly, the final version of the bill did not actually protect an individual’s
“right to be let alone.” It instead gave a citizen access to the information held about him
and a degree of power to change that information. The Privacy Act recognized that,
while the government was still entitled to hold information on citizens, it should do so in
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a public and fair way. The Privacy Act also indicated that electronic eavesdropping
violated the Fourth amendment, giving privacy roots in the Bill of Rights. While the
Privacy Act grants individuals rights to access their own personal files kept by
government agencies and to keep them from being disclosed except for the purposes of a
case-specific investigation, the 1974 FOIA allows citizens to access all federal agency
records. If a conflict between the Privacy Act and FOIA arises, for example when
personal records protected by the Privacy Act are requested under FOIA, the conflict is
reconciled by Section 552a(b)(2) of the Privacy Act, which gives the public’s right to
know precedence over its right to keep information secret.235 Yet despite its
shortcomings and contradictions, the act most importantly declared: “The right of privacy
is a personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the United States.”236
The Privacy Act was only the beginning. It created the Privacy Protection Study
Commission to investigate its efficacy, and impact, and the need for further federal
legislation.237 It also influenced the founding of numerous other Congressional
committees to investigate the future of privacy in America, and spurred major journalistic
interest, including the founding of The Privacy Journal.238 It also required each
governmental agency to publish an annual notice describing each of its informationgathering systems, follow strict guidelines to protect subjects’ information and alert the
subjects of the information held on them and allow the subject to check for accuracy, and
limit its record-keeping to “information necessary to accomplish an agency function
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required by law or Presidential order.”239 In other words, Congress had taken many steps
ensure that privacy intrusions would no longer plague the American system. The people
would have their constitutionally, legally and statutorily protected rights to privacy.
Privacy had become an institutionalized revolution.
Conclusion
It is clear that by the time the Privacy Act passed in 1974, the dam that held back
the surge of privacy activity had crumbled. Privacy was no longer amorphous or
overlooked in society. It was protected, supported, and talked-about. This was true not
only with information and technology privacy, but with marital and reproductive privacy,
as well. Interestingly, this protection resulted from a two-pronged push, both intentional
and unintentional, for privacy legislation. One push stemmed from the Court, which
specialized in criminal and reproductive privacy. The other stemmed from Congress,
which concentrated on information and technology privacy; there was very little overlap
between the two. The only overlap stemmed from debates about criminal justice issues,
which Congress rarely linked back to privacy. The Congressional Record indicates that
legislative interest in privacy revolved solely around information and technology privacy
as understood from the lack of Congressional discussion about reproductive or marital
privacy rights.240 Even in years in which the Court issued landmark privacy cases,
Congress only discussed the right to informational privacy. During Roe v. Wade,
Congress published absolutely no material pertaining to the Court’s version of privacy.
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Government publications during the early 1970s dealt solely with issues of computer
privacy, privacy of federal employees, banks, criminal justice, data banks, financial
records, etc.,241 but the House Subcommittees on Postal Operations and Postal Facilities
and Mail did hold two hearings regarding sexually explicit or “obscene” information sent
through the mail. This concern focused on the post and obscenity rather than the privacy,
though.242 Similarly, the Court rarely dealt with issues of information and technology
privacy. Instead, it left those issues to Congress to regulate. The two disparate areas of
privacy interest created gaps that the other could fill and combined to form an
overarching and compartmentalized privacy that could easily be regulated.
We can attribute a portion of this somewhat surprising lack of overlap in approach
to the different parties informing the Court and Congress. The set of interest groups that
filed amicus briefs in cases like Griswold v. Connecticut, Katz v. United States and Roe v.
Wade was largely distinct from the set of groups that testified to Congress in its
committee hearings before it passed the Federal Privacy Act of 1974. The Court saw
significant interest from state attorneys general in its privacy related cases, like Griswold,
Stanley v. Georgia, and Katz v. Untied States, in addition to receiving briefs from many
individual attorneys. In its abortion-specific cases, it received briefs from Planned
Parenthood Federation of America, human rights organizations, religious organizations,
and several medical associations.243 Congress, on the other hand, called upon technology
innovators, experts, and individuals involved with governmental-sponsored spying to
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testify at its committee hearings.244 The American Civil Liberties Union was the only
group appealing to both the Court and Congress. This lack of overlap reinforces the
extent to which privacy was a fractured issue area. That different facets of privacy had
different constituencies in society—pushing simultaneously, but pushing for different
protections from different institutions. As the press and public joined the debate, they
added particular voices and emphases to the deliberations in Congress. With pressure
mounting, Congress had little choice other than to pass something, but the specifics may
have been less certain.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Implications
Though the Court started taking stabs at defining and applying privacy
immediately after Griswold in 1965, the legislature only began to systematically dissect
privacy after Roe and Watergate hit the limelight. The two-pronged influence that
pushed privacy to the forefront—one stemming from the Courts and one stemming from
the press and the government, with the public in support of action in both realms—
practically forced the Privacy Act into existence. Until 1974, privacy was too ethereal to
elicit sweeping regulation. With numerous failed prior attempts to regulate privacy, the
Federal Privacy Act required further research and development of privacy’s many
components and thus further paved the way for the privacy that we understand today.
Beginning in the early twentieth century when the Court’s and Congress’
interpretations of privacy began to diverge, the concept became less and less clear. As
the Court and Congress applied different interpretations of the privacy right to different
situations, privacy became broader and less easily broken-down for analysis. Because the
Court and Congress struggled to consistently apply the right to an array of situations, it
became more difficult to define and regulate. Therefore, more than half a century of such
confused inaction or misaction toward privacy erected something of a privacy dam—a
blockade that prevented any institutional definition or systematic regulation. Privacy
became more obscured by misconception and lack of definition, and America was
instilled with an idea about an ambiguous right “to be let alone” that had no substantive
support.
In general, America did not have a secure enough understanding of privacy to
take the necessary steps to protect it. The American public assumed this mysterious right
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would endure but did not feel the need to take the necessary steps to protect it. Those
steps would include a systematic breakdown of privacy’s components, narrowly tailored
regulation, and creation of specialized agencies to track and enforce it. 245 Even if
Americans wanted to protect privacy, it would have been difficult to regulate such a
general right. Legislation would be overbroad and nearly impossible to enforce because
few people understood it. The Court’s declaration of privacy to be a fundamental right in
1965, though, formed the first crack in the dam. In the decade following, as shown in
figure 6.1, cracks began to form a result of pressure from the Court, the government,
intellectual and media elites, and later, the public.
Figure 6.1: The Privacy Story
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First, the Supreme Court pulled the rest of the country along behind its proactive
privacy holding while it grappled with defining and applying the concept. Though it
consistently refused to grant privacy rights to criminals and deviants, the Court captured
the public by potentially threatening the privacy of regular, non-criminal women. The
Justices held that reproductive and marital privacy was fundamental, and garnered
support from pro-choice organizations, women’s rights organizations, and medical
organizations. With little regard from Congress, the Court expanded these views in Roe
v. Wade, which solidified the Court’s position as the sole arbiter of sexual privacy.
Simultaneously, privacy was pushed into mainstream thought by the FBI and privacy
invasions in the White House, Congress, the press and the public. Congress was aware of
FBI and executive behavior, which it publicized to the press and the public. Slowly, the
public gained awareness of governmental privacy invasions, which the Pentagon Papers
and Watergate scandals greatly exacerbated. It is no coincidence that the public was
more apt to internalize news about governmental privacy invasions only after it had lost
faith in the White House as a result of the Watergate scandal. The media also contributed
by generating unease about the reality of government privacy intrusions. To combat this,
Congress dealt almost exclusively with information and technology privacy—the area of
greatest public and media concern.
Pressure to regulate privacy coalesced from the push, the pull and the divergent
interpretations of the privacy right. Each source mounted pressure until 1973 when the
combination of Roe v. Wade and Watergate broke the dam entirely, resulting in a flood of
privacy discourse, legislation and litigation from disparate realms of jurisdiction. Roe
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was especially notable because it was an anomaly in the Courts. First, it deviated from
the Court’s trend of not applying the right to privacy in most cases. Second, it deviated
because it threatened not to grant the fundamental right to everyday women, where it had
previously threatened not to grant the right to criminals and deviants. Watergate gained
attention because it provided, through the press, the hard-hitting realization for the
American public that the White House was capable of vast indiscretion and was therefore
untrustworthy.
After 1973, privacy had become so salient in both the marital and the
informational realms that it begged analysis, classification, and the protection, resulting
in the Federal Privacy Act of 1974—an act that would be only the foundation for a litany
of privacy-related legislation in years to come. The Privacy Act was a direct result of the
two-pronged pressure for privacy regulation. Together, the Court and Congress created a
comprehensive fundamental right to privacy.
It is interesting to speculate about the existence of a Privacy Act absent one or
both of these prongs. Without the Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade, Congress likely would
still have created the Privacy Act; it did not specifically protect the Court’s version of
privacy, after all. Without Watergate, Congress would likely have developed the Act
eventually, as well, but assuredly not with the same haste or gravity. Doubtless, political
musterings would have evolved into a substantial piece of privacy legislation, but it is
unlikely that it would have been as comprehensive or provocative for future government
action. But because Watergate facilitated awareness of the extent to which the
government could violate its citizens, inspired Nixon to speak out against government
intrusions on people’s privacy, piqued Congressional interest in the scope of government

109

misdeeds, and turned the public mood against the administration, the resulting Privacy
Act was virtually unavoidable. The Watergate and Roe combination heavily expedited
the legislative process, which resulted in a hastily drawn piece of legislation. At a
minimum it was a starting place for a privacy with separate component parts that multiple
levels of society and politics could discuss, monitor, and further regulate.
This tale indicates several possible themes regarding rights-talk in the United
States. First, though issues may be latent in the public consciousness, introduction of a
catalyst enables the issue to rapidly take-hold. If the public is unaware of the problem,
that catalyst can originate from scholarly, media and political attention, which, given
enough concern, can filter down to the public. Regardless of the issues that circulate
amongst political and academic elites, they must enter the public mind in order gain full
salience. Absent media attention, which made the privacy issue palatable to everyone,
the public would likely not become aware of privacy issues and Congress would not have
made it a fundamental right with such speed or seriousness. This interpretation of
privacy’s tumultuous history has revealed and illustrated an example in which legal
change can emanate out of awareness of a problem that first appears to those at the
highest level of politics. In this situation, the impetus for change has flowed from the
top, down. I have argued that privacy began in an elite governmental and scholarly
discourse and gradually filtered down to the public from two directions; first, as press
publication of and congressional attention to increasingly invasive governmental privacy
investigations heightened privacy became more salient, and second, as the Court issued
an anomalous, more widespread holding, the people became more aware. Essentially, I
argue that privacy emerged as an elite discourse and percolated down to the public
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through Congress and the press from two disparate origins—marital/reproductive privacy
and information/technology privacy. This model is unique to the privacy movement, as
the scholarly and political elites were the only ones aware of the privacy problem. It was
their consistent attention that pushed privacy into the mainstream.
Some scholars prefer a bottom-up approach to legal and political change, in which
they credit citizens, activists and interest groups with initiating legal, political or social
change movements.246 This approach could be (and is) applied to privacy in the 1960s
and 70s. Perhaps it was the same interest groups filing amicus briefs and providing test
cases to the Court that generated media attention and petitioned Congress to statutorily
protect their privacy. Though it is entirely possible that grassroots organizations
provided the necessary incentive to both the Court and Congress to finally tackle the
privacy issue, this does not appear to have been the case. Privacy is an anomaly in this
way because invasions were just that—they were private. It is possible that if privacy
invasions had been common knowledge, the public would have initiated the movement.
Instead, the public was unaware of the extent to which the government was intruding on
privacy rights, and remained out of the movement until they became fully aware of the
problem.
Also, this story sheds some light on the role of institutions within political
systems. Though seemingly independent, all political institutions have one thing in
common: the public. As long as someone passes information to the public, institutions
can be held accountable for their actions. That is, once the public becomes aware of
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institutional activity, it can provide the necessary, back-end leverage for social, legal, and
political change.
Privacy Today
Presently, the Court deals more extensively with physical privacy—one’s rights to
his body, home and marriage—that is most easily protected by the penumbras found
within the Bill of Rights. It falls to the policymakers, then, to make rules about
informational privacy—the privacy which was not as easily found within the first ten and
fourteenth amendments. In other words, “judicial policies failed to foster a framework
for and legal safeguards for ensuring privacy interests with respect to mandatory
nonassociational and nonincriminatory disclosures of personal information, governmental
access to personal information held by third parties, and governmental storage and
disclosure of personal information.”247 Between the Court’s mixed interpretations of the
privacy right and the legislature’s protection of privacy pertaining to different realms of
society, scholars, both past and present, disagree about the actual state of privacy. Still,
we can see that current governmental dealings with privacy developed as a result of
different views on private property rights in the 1920s. From that point on, the Court and
Congress diverged in their interpretations and applications of privacy, growing apart
throughout the 1960s and ‘70s when they each declared the right to be fundamental, but
applying it to the different realms we see today.
In 1891, Justice Cray commented in Union Pacific Railway Company v. Botsford
that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person free from a
247
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restraint or interference of others unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”248
Several decades later, Justice Brandeis articulated privacy’s importance with the same
fervor, stating that privacy is the “most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men.”249 Clearly, privacy was important to these men. But more than a
century later, we still glorify and herald our fundamental right to privacy. While its
definitions and applications have morphed throughout the decades, it still exists steadfast
in the American psyche. And it was a two-pronged, top-down influence that set privacy
on its complex journey to fundamentality from the Court to the country.
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